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  • den Bhunreacht sa leagan Gaeilge ná an méid seo a leanas I gcás an tUachtarán do chur a láimhe le téacs Bille í dteanga de na teangacha oifigiúla agus sa teanga sin amháin ní foláir tiontú oifigiúil a chur amach sa teanga oifigiúil eile Is mar seo a leanas atá sé sa leagan Béarla Where the President signs the text of a Bill in one only of the official languages an official translation shall be issued in the other official language Táim sásta ag breathnú ceann ar aghaidh air nó trí léirmhíniú ceart a fháil ar an Airteagal seo nach bhfuil aon dualgas bunreachtúil ann reachtaíocht a achtú sa dá theanga oifigiúla Is léir go bhféadfar an phríomhtheanga oifigiúil Gaeilge nó an dara teanga oifigiúil Béarla a úsáid chun críche reachtaíocht a achtú Ní gá Bille nuair a chuireann an tUachtarán a lámh leis a shíniú sa dá theanga Is léir é seo freisin ó fhoclaíocht an Airteagail féin a shamhlaíonn tíolacadh Bille le lámh a chur leis agus a fhógairt i dteanga oifigiúil amháin de bhrí nach mbeadh aon riachtanas ann thairis sin tagairt do leagan sa teanga oifigiuil eile Chomh luath is a chuireann an tUachtarán a lámh le Bille i dteanga amháin is Acht é ansin de bhua fhorálacha Airteagal 25 4 1 den Bhunreacht Is mar seo a leanas a léann an tAirteagal sin Déanann dlí de gach Bille an lá a chuireann an tUachtarán a lámh leis faoin mBunreacht seo agus is dlí é an lá sin agus ón lá sin amach agus mura léir a mhalairt d intinn ina thaobh is é an lá sin a thagann sé i ngníomh Mar sin cé go dtráchtann Airteagal 25 4 4 ar leagan a bheith ar fáil sa teanga oifigiúil eile sa chás nach gcuirtear Bille de láimh ach i leagan amháin dealraíonn sé domsa gurb é léirmhíniú ceart an Airteagail seo nár gurb é an rud a chuirfear ar fáil ná tiontú oifigiúil Bille chomh luath is a chuirtear lámh leis is é sin Acht an Oireachtais Glacann an freagróir leis seo toisc nach ndéantar aon argóint go gciallaíonn Airteagal 25 4 4 gur cheart leagan de Bhille a chur ar fáil go comhuaineach ós rud é go bhfuil an freagróir ag tagairt i gcónaí do dhualgas maidir le hAchtanna an Oireachtais Cé go ndéanann an freagróir roinnt plé freisin ar an idirdhealú idir a lámh a chur leis agus a fhógairt ní mheasaim gur féidir leis seo an chiall atá le hAirteagal 25 4 4 i ndáiríre a athrú Níl aon rud le rá in Airteagal 25 4 4 maidir le tráthúlacht an cháis rud a aithnigh an Chúirt seo in Ó Beoláin v Fahy supra is é sin le rá maidir leis an gceist a bhaineann le cathain a chuirfear ar fáil leagan de Bhille sa teanga seachas an teanga ina gcuirtear lámh leis Níl aon fhocal nó frása teamparálta ama le fáil i gceachtar leagan teanga den Airteagal seo a bhí in úsáid ag dréachtóirí an Bhunreachta a d fhéadfadh tacú le tuairim an fhreagróra go bhfuil dualgas ag éirí ón bhfoclaíocht atá in úsáid chun aistriúchán comhuaineach a thabhairt nó a chur ar fáil sa teanga oifigiúil eile nuair a cuireann an Uachtarán lamh le Bille i dteanga oifigiúil amháin I leagan Gaeilge an Airteagail ní labhraítear ach amháin faoi I gcás an tUachtarán do chur a láimhe ní foláir tiontú oifigiúil a chur amach cé go dtráchtann an leagan Béarla air Where the President signs the text of a Bill an official translation shall be issued Ní thugann an focal I gcás i nGaeilge a chiallaíonn Where nó In the case of ná an frása Where the President signs i mBéarla aon tráthúlacht faoi leith gan trácht ar riachtanas a ghearradh go gcaithfidh fáil chomhuaineach a bheith ag an bpobal ar Bhille arna chur de láimh i dteanga amháin sa dara teanga Níl aon éifeacht ag an dualgas arna léiriú ag ní foláir tiontú a chur amach i nGaeilge agus ag an official translation shall be issued i mBéarla ar an gceist a bhaineann le tráthúlacht an dualgais sin Ar an lámh eile má bhí sé i gceist ag lucht cheaptha an Bhunreachta nuair a chuireann an tUachtarán a lámh le Bille i dteanga oifigiúil amháin gur chóir go mbeadh aistriúchán den leagan sin ar fáil go comhuaineach sa teanga oifigiúil eile mar atá á áitiú ag an bhfreagróir bheadh an dualgas sin sách simplí lena ghearradh agus trí theanga chomh simplí agus chomh díreach céanna a úsáid D fhéadfaí foráil a dhéanamh mar shampla sa chás go gcuireann an tUachtarán téacs Bille a thíolactar i dteanga amháin de láimh gur chóir go gcuirfeadh an tUachtarán a lámh le leagan den Bhille sa teanga oifigiúil eile ag an am céanna nó láithreach bonn ina dhiaidh sin Nó d fhéadfaí foráil a bheith déanta go simplí sa chás go gcuireann an tUachtarán a lámh le Bille i dteanga oifigiúil amháin gur chóir tiontú oifigiúil de sin a fhoilsiú go comhuaineach sa teanga oifigiúil eile Níor glacadh le ceachtar de na réitigh an simplí sin áfach Ina theannta sin táim sásta go bhfuil tacaíocht laistigh d Airteagal 25 4 féin don tuairim gurb é ba chóir a aistriú ná leagan de Bhille arna chur de láimh ag an Uachtarán gan aon teorainn ama a bheith i gceist lena haistriú Léann Airteagal 25 4 5 Chomh luath agus is féidir é tar éis Bille a shíniú agus é a fhógairt ina dhlí ní foláir an téacs den dlí sin lena mbeidh lámh an Uachtaráin nó i gcás lámh an Uachtaráin a bheith le téacs Gaeilge agus le téacs Sacs Bhéarla an dlí sin an dá théacs sínithe sin a chur isteach ina iris nó ina n iris in oifig Iriseoir na Cúirte Uachtaraí agus is fianaise dhochloíte ar fhorálacha an dlí sin an téacs a chuirfear isteach ina iris nó an dá théacs a chuirfear isteach ina n iris amhlaidh Sa chás go mbeadh argóint an fhreagróra ceart is beag fiúntais a bheadh ag forálacha Airteagal 25 4 4 dá ma rud é go raibh an dá leagan le bheith ar fáil go comhuaineach ar sínú an tUachtarán níl aon amhras faoi ach nach ndéanfadh lucht ceaptha an Bhunreachta foráil don dá chás dhifriúla in Airteagal 25 4 5 áit a gcuirtear leagan teanga amháin de Bhille i láthair an Uachtaráin nó ina áit sin Bille atá le cur de láimh sa dá theanga oifigiúla Sula ligim ar leataobh an ghné seo den achomharc ba chóir dom tagairt a dhéanamh do na breithiúnais mhionsonraithe agus léannta a thug McGuinness Brmh agus Hardiman Brmh i gcás Ó Beoláin v Fahy supra Tá sé i gceist agam déileáil leis an gcás sin freisin faoin gcéad cheannteideal eile ach tá gné áirithe amháin de na breithiúnais a chaithfidh mé a lua ag an bpointe seo de bhrí go ndéanann an freagróir an cinneadh seo a ghairm mar thaca lena argóint maidir le hAirteagal 25 4 4 Dheonaigh gach aon breitheamh dearbhuithe de réir théarmaí an Fhógra Foriarratais arna thíolacadh den chéad uair ag an iarratasóir sna himeachtaí athbhreithnithe bhreithiúnaigh san Ard Chúirt Rinneadh an dearbhú mar a bhí á lorg ann i dtéarmaí dualgais bhunreachtúil a éilíodh nó dualgais chun Achtanna an Oireachtais a chur ar fáil don phobal ar a n áirítear an t iarratasóir sa chás sin when the President signs the text of a Bill in the second official language I leagan Gaeilge an dearbhaithe a bhí á lorg faightear an when sa chomhthéacs sin díreach mar is ceart nuair a gcuireann an tUachtarán a lámh Áitíonn an tUasal O Tuathail abhcóide sinsearach don fhreagróir san achomharc seo in argóint ó bhéal go léirítear an cur síos a dhéantar ar an dualgas atá ar fáil in Airteagal 25 4 4 tríd úsáid a bhaint as an téarma when nuair seo sna leaganacha Béarla agus Gaeilge Ní úsáideann Airteagal 25 4 4 áfach ceachtar de na focail when nó nuair agus creidim go bhfuil an baol ann lena n úsáid go dtabharfar forchiall an difriúil don Airteagal seo de bhrí go bhféadfadh ciall theamparálta a bheith ag na focail seo i gcomhthéacsanna áirithe Ní aontaím mar sin le hargóint an fhreagróra gur ceart é a ra go bhfuil an dualgas curtha síos mar sin Níor mheas breithiúnas McGuinness Brmh nó Hardiman Brmh go bhfuil riachtannas bunreachtúil ann faoi Airteagal 25 4 4 aistriúchán comhuaineach a dhéanamh Táimse tar éis a rá nach bhfuil aon fhocail theamparálta theoranta san Airteagal arna ghairm ag an bhfreagróir sa chás seo chun tacú le dualgas bunreachtúil aistriúchán comhuaineach a dhéanamh Táim sásta nuair a léitear Airteagal 25 4 4 i gceart nach ann don dualgas bunreachtúil atá áitithe maidir le haistriúchán comhuaineach a chur ar fáil sa phríomhtheanga oifigiúil de Bhille arna chur de láimh sa teanga eile is é sin le rá Acht an Oireachtais An Argóint maidir le hAirteagal 8 Téann an freagróir mar sin féin i dtuilleamaí Airteagal 25 4 4 nuair a léitear é i gcomhar le hAirteagal 8 den Bhunreacht mar thaca lena argóint go gcuireann an Bunreacht in ainneoin sin dualgas chun tiontú nó leagan d Acht an Oireachtais a chur ar fáil go comhuaineach chomh luath is a chuireann an tUachtarán a lámh leis Léann Airteagal 8 den Bhunreacht mar seo a leanas 1 Ós í an Ghaeilge an teanga náisiúnta is í an phríomhtheanga oifigiúil í 2 Glactar leis an Sacs Bhéarla mar theanga oifigiúil eile 3 Ach féadfar socrú a dhéanamh le dlí d fhonn ceachtar den dá theanga sin a bheith ina haonteanga le haghaidh aon ghnó nó gnóthaí oifigiúla ar fud an Stáit ar fad nó in aon chuid de Déantar argóint an fhreagróra ar an bhforas d fhonn aitheantas iomchuí agus ceart a thabhairt do stádas bunreachtúil na Gaeilge mar an phríomhtheanga oifigiúil go gcaithfidh leaganacha Gaeilge d Achtanna an Oireachtais a bheith ar fáil go comhuaineach leis an leagan Béarla dóibh sin b fhéidir ar mian leo Gaeilge a úsáid ina gcuid gnóthaí dlí mar shampla Braitheann an argóint sin go pointe áirithe ar an tuairim go bhfuil dualgas bunreachtúil ann Achtanna den sórt sin a bheith ar fáil ar théarmaí nach lú a mbuntáiste ná an tAcht i mBéarla frása a tógadh is cosúil ó chásdlí áirithe i gCeanada arna ghairm in Ó Beoláin v Fahy supra Ina bhreithiúnas sa chás reatha áfach ní dhearna an breitheamh Ard Chúirte léannta aon tagairt in aon chor faoi Airteagal 8 d an Bhunreachtas Áitíonn na hachomharcóirí nach bhfuil sé iomchuí féachaint ar bhunreachtanna tíortha cosúil le Ceanada nó ar chásdlí maidir le bunreachtanna den sórt sin nuair a bhítear i mbun machnaimh ar Airteagal 8 toisc i gcodarsnacht leis an seasamh in Éirinn nuair a rinneadh dlí den Bhunreacht ní raibh an Stát scartha nó roinnte in dhá phobal teanga ar leithligh agus dhifriúla mar a bhí i gcás Cheanada rud a spreagann ábhar machnaimh difriúil ar fad Cé go raibh limistéir Ghaeltachta laistigh den Stát níorbh áiteanna iad sin nár múineadh Béarla go coitianta iontu nó nár tuigeadh cloiseadh nó nár labhraíodh Béarla iontu Agus ina theanta sin is iomaí duine ar fud an Stáit a mhaígh go raibh siad oilte i nGaeilge agus i mBéarla araon Ní hé an cás é mar sin gur glacadh le hAirteagal 8 mar a thugann an freagróir le fios ag féachaint le dhá phobal mona theangacha a éascú laistigh de Stát amháin mar a bhí i gcás Cheanada Is a mhalairt de scéal a bhí ann dar leo Agus an Bunreacht á ghlacadh ní raibh foráil ann ach do cheangal éigeantach amháin maidir le tiontú oifigiúil téacsanna dlí agus ní raibh i gceist an uair sin féin ach Achtanna an Oireachtais agus sin é an dualgas atá in Airteagal 25 4 4 Déanann siad an argóint nach féidir le hAirteagal 8 na dualgais a éiríonn faoi Airteagal 25 a thabhairt don fhreagróir ina argóint Áitíonn na hachomharcóirí freisin nach féidir leis an bhfreagróir iarracht a dhéanamh mar a dhéanann sé go ndéanfaí aistriú go Gaeilge mar a mholann sé ar Chorpas Dlí na hÉireann de bhun fhorálacha Airteagal 25 4 4 nuair a léitear iad i gcomhar le hAirteagal 8 Cuireann siad béim air nach bhfuil foráil in aon chor sa Bhunreacht a éilíonn go ndéanfaí aistriú ar Reachtanna réamh 1922 ná go deimhin ar Ionstraimí Reachtúla nó ar Orduithe réamh 1922 Níl aon dualgas sa Bhunreacht ach an oiread chun téacsanna a bhaineann leis an dlí coiteann nó le breithiúnais chúirteanna na hÉireann a aistriú Níl aon fhoráil idirthréimhseach sa Bhunreacht sa leagan a ghlacadh i 1937 ag éileamh go ndéanfaí dlíthe atá ann cheana a aistriú laistigh d aon thréimhse ama Níl aon chúis ann mar sin dar leis an argóint Airteagal 25 4 4 a fhorléiriú ar bhealach atá i gcontrátha leis na focail a roghnaíodh chun an dualgas atá ann a léiriú nuair a léitear go nádúrtha é Ní féidir le hiarracht an fhreagróra forálacha Airteagal 8 den Bhunreacht a ghairm a bheith mar bhonn cirt go dleathach ná go bunreachtúil le haon athrú ar an seasamh sin Téann an freagróir i gcoinne na hargóinte deiridh sin nuair a deir sé nach bhfuil siad ach ag iarraidh seasamh leis na dearbhuithe a deonaíodh san Ard Chúirt i dtaca le hAchtanna an Oireachtais le hIonstraimí Reachtúla agus le Rialacha na Cúirte Téann siad i dtuilleamaí bhreithiúnais McGuinness Brmh agus Hardiman Brmh in Ó Beoláin supra Sa chéad cheann díobh sin dúradh Is ceist í seo faoi cheart dul chun cúirte daoine a labhraíonn ceachtar den dá theanga oifigiúla atá ainmnithe in Airteagal 8 den Bhunreacht Sa dara ceann dúradh Ag cuimhneamh ar stádas na Gaeilge feictear domsa go bhfuil siad siúd ar mian leo í a úsáid i dteideal iomlán é sin a dhéanamh agus i dteideal gach áis atá riachtanach chun é a dhéanamh ar a laghad sa mhéid is atá áiseanna dá leithéid at fáil dóibh siúd a úsáideann an dara teanga oifigiúil Conclúid maidir le hAirteagal 8 Ní mheasaim go dtacaíonn ceachtar den dá ráiteas deiridh seo astu féin agus go háirithe le haird ar an gcomhthéacs inar úsáideadh iad sa chás thuas leis an dualgas atá á áitiú eadhon gur chóir nuair a léitear é le hAirteagal 8 den Bhunreacht Airteagal 25 4 4 a léirmhíniú mar rud a chiallaíonn go bhfuil dualgas ar na hachomharcóirí leagan comhuaineach nó aistriúchán den Acht i nGaeilge a chur ar fáil nuair a chuireann an tUachtarán a lámh le Bille a tíolacadh di le síniú i mBéarla Níl aon amhras faoi ach go dtacaíonn an breithiúnas thuas agus cúpla ceann eile a dtagraítear dóibh freisin sa bhreithiúnas sin leis an áitiú gur chóir aistriúcháin den sórt sin a chur ar fáil laistigh de thréimhse ama réasúnta nó fiú amháin laistigh de thréimhse ama an ghearr rud a ndíreoidh mé air níos déanaí sa bhreithiúnas seo Ina theannta sin cé go ngairtear Airteagal 8 3 ní thugann sé seo aon chúnamh don fhreagróir i ndáiríre Tá stádas an dá theanga leagtha amach go soiléir in Airteagal 8 1 agus Airteagal 8 2 Is foráil chumasúcháin é Airteagal 8 3 a cheadaíonn agus nach gcuireann mar dhualgas forálacha dlí a ghlacadh tríd Acht nó ar shlí éigin eile d fhonn ceachtar den dá theanga a úsáid chun críoch oifigiúil amháin nó níos mó ar fud an Stáit ar fad nó in aon chuid de Mar fhoráil chumasúcháin dar le hargóint na n achomharcóirí is é atá agus a bhí i gceist nó mar aidhm ag lucht ceaptha an Bhunreachta arna léiriú in Airteagal 8 3 ná caomhnú agus síneadh úsáid na Gaeilge a éascú agus aontaím leis sin Ardaíodh an chiall atá le hAirteagal 8 3 agus chinn an Chúirt seo í an Príomh Bhreitheamh O Dalaigh Kingsmill Moore Brmh agus Walsh Brmh in Attorney General v Coyne and Wallace 1967 101 ILTR 17 agus inar dúirt Kingsmill Moore I was at first inclined to the view that 8 3 meant that an official document to be operative must be both in Irish and English unless provision had been made by law sanctioning the use of only one of the languages It was argued for the Attorney General that the true meaning of the Article was that either languages sic might be used unless provision had been made by law that one language only was to be used for some one or more official purposes On consideration I consider this construction to be correct Accordingly I am of opinion that the decision of the District Justice was not correct and the case should be sent back to him to enter continuances D aontaigh Walsh Brmh go sainráite leis an léamh a rinne Kingsmill Moore Brmh ar Airteagal 8 3 den Bhunreacht Ina theannta sin in Delap v An dAire Eli agus Cirt 1980 1998 IR Tuairiscí Speisialta 46 ghlac O Hanlon leis go raibh sé faoi cheangal ag an léirmhíniú thuas ar Airteagal 8 3 den Bhunreacht Maidir le hAirteagail 8 1 agus 8 2 rinneadh seachadadh ar na breithiúnais in Ó Beoláin v Fahy supra i gcomhthéacs áirithe Ní mór é sin a leagan amach Bhí an t iarratasóir cúisithe as cionta i gcontrátha le forálacha áirithe den Acht um Thrácht ar Bhóithre 1961 arna leasú Bhí Gaeilge ag an bhfear agus seirbheáladh an toghairm air i nGaeilge agus is i nGaeilge a dhéileáil na Gardaí leis ar feadh an fhiosrúcháin ar fad Bhí sé tugtha le fios aige don Chúirt go raibh fonn air a chosaint a bheith i nGaeilge agus go raibh sé ag iarraidh go ndéanfaí na doiciméid chuí a sheirbheáil air i nGaeilge agus go háirithe bhí sé ag iarraidh leaganacha Gaeilge den Acht um Thrácht ar Bhóithre 1994 ina ndearnadh leasú ar Acht na bliana 1961 den Acht um Thrácht ar Bhóithre 1995 agus de Rialacha na Cúirte Dúiche 1997 ionas go bhféadfadh sé a chosaint a dhéanamh sa chúirt i nGaeilge Ní raibh na doiciméid sin ar fáil Mar thoradh air sin cuireadh na himeachtaí sa Chúirt Dúiche ar athló ó am go ham chun ligean d údaráis an Stáit na doiciméid a bhí á lorg a chur ar fáil agus lena chinntiú go raibh breitheamh a raibh Gaeilge ar a thoil aige nó aici ar fáil chun an cás a éisteacht Cuireadh dréacht aistriúcháin nó aistriúcháin neamhoifigiúla de na hAchtanna um Thrácht ar Bhóithre 1994 agus 1995 ar fáil ach níor cuireadh aon aistriúchán ar fáil de Rialacha na Cúirte Dúiche agus lorg an t iarratasóir trína abhcóide ordú ag treorú don Stiúrthóir Ionchúiseamh Poiblí iad a chur ar fáil Dhiúltaigh an Breitheamh Dúiche an t iarratas sin agus lorg an t iarratasóir athbhreithniú breithiúnach ar a n áirítear Ordú Toirmisc chomh maith le dearbhuithe Ba iad na dearbhuithe a lorgaíodh in aghaidh an Aire Dlí agus Cirt Comhionannais agus Athchóirithe Dlí agus na hÉireann ná ar an gcéad dul síos go raibh dualgas bunreachtúil ar na páirtithe sin aistriúcháin go Gaeilge a chur ar fáil don iarratasóir ar na hAchtanna um Thrácht ar Bhóithre 1994 agus 1995 ar an dara dul síos go raibh dualgas bunreachtúil ar na cosantóirí sin ar a n áirítear an t iarratasóir Achtanna an Oireachtais a chur ar fáil don phobal nuair a chuireann an tUachtarán a lámh le téacs Bille sa dara teanga agus dearbhú deiridh go raibh dualgas bunreachtúil ar na cosantóirí céanna tiontú oifigiúil a chur ar fáil d Ionstraim Reachtúil Uimh 93 1997 Rialacha na Cúirte Dúiche 1997 don phobal ar a n áirítear an t iarratasóir Diúltaíodh san Ard Chúirt do na faoisimh a lorgaíodh Rinne an t iarratasóir achomharc leis an gCúirt seo Rinne an triúr breitheamh seachadadh ar bhreithiúnais sa Chúirt seo Deir na hachomharcóirí san achomharc seo go bhfuil sé tábhachtach tuiscint a bheith ann ar na boinn dhifriúla ar a mbunaíonn an triúr breitheamh a gcuid breithiúnas Bhí beirt bhreithimh i bhfabhar an achomharcóra agus bhí duine amháin ina choinne Sa mheid go bhuineann sé le breithiúnas McGuinness Brmh a bhí i bhfabhar an achomharcóra dúirt sí sa chuid ábhartha dá breithiúnas an méid seo a leanas Mar a chuir abhcóidí ar an dá thaobh ar shúile na cúirte seo ní leagann Airteagal 25 4 4 aon fhráma ama síos maidir le soláthar aistriúcháin ar gach Bille Achta Ach is cosúil ón Airteagal ar fad gur nós imeachta sách scioptha a bhí i gceist In aon áit a bhfuil teorainneacha ama i gceist is teorainneacha gearra iad Tá an modh oibre réamh 1980 trína gcuirtí aistriúcháin ar fáil nach mór go comhuaineach le hachtú an reachta níos cosúla go mór le tiúin ghinearálta an Airteagail ná an bealach atá ann anois nach gcuirtear aistriúchán ar fáil ach amháin nuair atá gá speisialta nó práinneach leis chomh fada agus is féidir leis an gcúirt a dheimhniú Ba mhó a bheadh cuma na macántachta ar argóint na bhfreagróirí gur cheart tréimhse réasúnach ama a thabhairt don aistriúchán murach an fhíric gur ar éigin atá aon aistriúchán oifigiúil curtha ar fáil le fiche bliain Ní féidir tréimhse réasúnach a thabhairt air sin Go deimhin féin ní dócha go gcuirfí aistriúchán go deo ar na reachtanna atá i gceist sa chás seo reachtanna atá á n úsáid go laethúil ins an Chúirt Dúiche murach iarracht an iarratasóra agus a chomhairleoirí dlí Chinn McGuinness Brmh freisin mar seo a leanas Deirimse go bhfuil an Stát thar thréimhse ama fada ag sárú an dualgais bhunreachtúil seo go scannalach neamhnáireach agus go mba cheart don Chúirt seo aird a dhíriú go poiblí ar nádúr sainordaitheach an dualgais atá leagtha síos in Airteagal 25 4 4 Deonaím an faoiseamh a d iarr an t iarratasóir in alt e den fhógra foriarratais Agus mé ag tabhairt an fhaoisimh dhearbhaithe seo táim ag glacadh leis go gcuirfidh an Stát chuige leis an bhfaillí láithreach a leigheas taobh istigh de achar gearr Ghlac Hardiman Brmh dearcadh difriúil ina bhreithiúnas agus eisean i bhfabhar an achomharcóra freisin Agus súil á choinneáil aige ar fhorbairt na bhforálacha maidir leis an nGaeilge i mBunreacht Saorstát Éireann agus cinntí an Phríomh Bhreithimh Kennedy glactha aige in O Foghludha v McClean 1934 I R 469 rinne sé tagairt ansin do bhreithiúnas O Hanlon Brmh in Ó Murchú v Registrar of Companies the Minister for Industry Commerce 1988 I R S R 42 a chuir béim ar an tábhacht a bhí le forálacha Airteagal 8 den Bhunreacht ó thaobh aitheantas a thabhairt don Ghaeilge ar bhonn níos láidre ná mar a thugtar in Airteagal 4 den Bhunreacht roimhe sin Dúirt Hardiman Brmh an méid seo a leanas Is í mo thuairimse nach féidir an Ghaeilge arb í an teanga náisiúnta í agus san am céanna arb í príomhtheanga oifigiúil an Stáit í a eisiamh ar a laghad in éagmais dlí den chineál a shamhlaítear le hAirteagal 8 3 ó aon chuid de dhioscúrsa poiblí an náisiúin nó ó aon ghnó oifigiúil de chuid an Stáit nó de chuid aon cheann dá bhaill Ná ní féidir caitheamh léi sna comhthéacsanna seo ar shlí ar bith nach bhfuil chomh fabhrach leis an tslí a gcaitear leis an dara teanga oifigiúil Ná ní féidir iad siúd atá inniúil agus ar mian leo í a úsáid chun iad féin a chur in iúl nó chun cumarsáide a chosc nó a fhágáil faoi mhíbhuntáiste agus iad á dhéanamh sin in aon chomhthéacs náisiúnta nó oifigiúil Ag cur an chinnidh sin i bhfeidhm tháinig sé ar an gconclúid nach bhféadfaí an t achomharcóir sa chás sin a chur faoi mhíbhuntáiste i gcomhthéacs cúisimh choiriúil a chosaint in imeachtaí na Cúirte Dúiche agus go raibh dualgas ann an dá Acht a lorgaíodh agus Rialacha infheidhmithe na Cúirte Dúiche a chur ar fáil don pháirtí sin i nGaeilge Maidir leis an tsaincheist shonrach a bhaineann leis an gceanglas bunreachtúil leagan Gaeilge a chur ar fáil de Bhille arna thíolacadh don Uachtarán agus arna shíniú aici níor mheas sé go raibh an argóint dhúbailte a cuireadh i láthair thar ceann an Stáit inmholta Bhain an chéad argóint le heaspa aon dualgas teamparálta shonrach a bheith sa Bhunreacht agus bhain an dara ceann leis an dualgas a bhí ag luí ní leis na freagróirí ach le Tithe an Oireachtais Ní gá dom an dara ábhar sin a bhreithniú i gcomhthéacs an achomhairc seo Mar sin féin maidir leis an gceist a bhaineann le cathain a thagann an dualgas chun cinn maidir le haistriúchán a chur ar fáil deir Hardiman Brmh De réir na hargóna seo b fhéidir go n imeodh na blianta agus an reachtaíocht atá i gceist á húsáid go laethúil gan aon aistriúchán a bheith ar fáil gan an Stát a bheith ag teip ina oibleagáid chomh fada is a bheadh sé i gceist dáiríre ag na húdaráis an t aistriúchán a chur ar fáil ar dháta éigin sa todhchaí Caithfidh go bhfuil sé soiléir nach réitíonn an argóint seo ar bhealach ar bith le stádas bunreachtúil na teanga náisiúnta ná leis an bpolasaí atá ann le fada maidir leis an dátheangachas i ngnó na gcúirteanna a cuireadh in iúl arís i bhfoirm reachtúil chomh déanach le 1998 I mo thuairimse caithfidh go bhfuil sé le tuiscint ó théarmaí Airteagal 25 4 4 go bhfuil ar an laghad an riachtanas ann an t aistriúchán oifigiúil a sholáthar chomh luath agus is féidir agus is soiléir go bhfuil ábhar maith argóna ann nach ndearnadh sa chás seo go gcaithfidh sé a bheith ar fáil sula dtugtar faoin Acht a chur i bhfeidhm ar dhuine atá inniúil agus ar mian leis a ghnóthaí oifigiúla a dhéanamh trí Ghaeilge Ina theannta sin is é an t aon chúis a d fhéadfaí a cheapadh leis an riachtanas atá ann aistriúchán oifigiúil a eisiúint ná go bhféadfadh na daoine sin arbh é a mian dleathach é a ngnó dlíthiúil a dhéanamh sa cheann sin de na teangacha oifigiúla nárbh í an teanga í ina ritheadh an bille Ó tá siad i dteideal é sin a dhéanamh is léir go bhfuil sé míréasúnach sa ghnáthchiall agus sa chiall dhlíthiúil atá leis an téarma sin an t aistriúchán sin a choinneáil uathu ar feadh tréimhse ar bith ama agus cinnte ar feadh na mblianta agus fiú ar feadh deich nó scór de bhlianta nó breis mar a tharla faraor i gcás reachtanna iomadúla Measaim go dtugann breithiúnais McGuinness Brmh agus Hardiman Brmh i gcás Ó Beoláin v Fahy supra tacaíocht iomlán do na conclúidí nach bhfuil na hachomharcóirí i dteideal aistriúcháin ar Achtanna an Oireachtais a choinneáil siar ar feadh tréimhsí ama atá míréasúnta agus nó a théann caol díreach i gcoinne stádas na Gaeilge mar an chéad phríomhtheanga oifigiúil de bhun Airteagal 8 den Bhunreacht Is léir ón dá bhreithiúnas go gcaithfear an dualgas maidir le leaganacha Gaeilge a chur ar fáil d Achtanna an Oireachtais a chomhlíonadh laistigh de thréimhse ama réasúnta nó chomh luath agus is féidir é sin a dhéanamh Níor thángthas ar aon chinneadh mar sin féin in aon bhreithiúnas maidir le dualgas leagan d Acht a chur ar fáil go comhuaineach nó ag an am céanna Dá mbeadh sé i gceist é sin a dhéanamh breithním gur dóigh go mbeadh sé luaite go ríshoiléir Dá bhféadfaí ar an lámh eile agus aird ar aon débhrí a d fhéadfadh a theacht chun cinn ó úsáid na bhfocal when nuair san fhaoiseamh a lorgaíodh agus a deonaíodh i gcás Ó Beoláin a thuiscint as sin go raibh sé i gceist go léireodh sé sin dualgas comhuaineach den sórt sin ní aontóinn féin le léirmhíniú den sórt sin rud nach ritheann ó ghnáth theanga Airteagal 25 ná ó na breithiúnais I gcás Ó Beoláin is léir nár cheap ceachtar de na mór bhreithiúnais gur comhlíonadh an dualgas bunreachtúil a thagann chun cinn ó Airteagal 25 4 4 ar feadh tréimhse fada ama Tá sé áisiúil arís ar ais forálacha Acht 2003 a lua agus alt 7 a fhorálann A luaithe is féidir tar éis aon Acht den Oireachtas a achtú déanfar an téacs den chéanna a chló agus a fhoilsiú go comhuaineach i ngach ceann de na teangacha oifigiúla béim curtha leis Is léir dar liom go leanann an fhoráil seo go dlúth cinneadh Hardiman Brmh in Ó Beoláin v Fahy supra go gcaithfear na haistriúcháin a chur ar fáil chomh luath agus is féidir Dealraítear domsa freisin go bhfuiltear ag comhlíonadh an dualgais a bhaineann le haistriúchán in Airteagal 25 4 4 den Bhunreacht go dóthanach agus go hiomchuí Áitíonn an freagróir sna himeachtaí seo gur chóir dualgas malartach a fháil eadhon dualgas a bheith ar na hachomharcóirí gur chóir nuair a shíníonn an tUachtarán Bille i mBéarla an leagan Gaeilge den Acht sin a chur ar fáil ar théarmaí nach lú a mbuntáiste ná an leagan Béarla Ag féachaint air ar bhonn bunreachtúil dealraíonn sé domsa go bhfuil foráil iomlán i bhforálacha Airteagal 25 le haghaidh rud den sórt sin Má shíníonn an tUachtarán Bille agus má thíolactar é i dteanga amháin caithfidh aistriúchán den bhille sin a bheith ar fáil sa teanga eile Sa chás mar sin go ndéantar Bille a thíolacadh i nGaeilge caithfear leagan Béarla den Bhille mar a síníodh é a chur ar fáil chun an ceanglas bunreachtúil a chomhlíonadh Ar an gcaoi chéanna má dhéantar an Bille a thíolacadh i mBéarla caithfear leagan nó aistriúchán de a chur ar fáil i nGaeilge Is cosúil domsa áfach go n úsáidtear an frása ar théarmaí nach lú a mbuntáiste i ndáiríre mar rud atá mar an gcéanna nó mar rud nach bhfuil difriúil go hábhartha ó go comhuaineach mar atá an focal sin in úsáid ag an bhfreagróir Is cosúil gur tóigeadh an frása ó chásdlí i gCeanada Is minic a tharlaíonn sé go gcuidíonn sé leis an gCúirt féachaint ar chásdlí i ndlínsí eile toisc é a bheith úsáideach i gcásanna a bhaineann le léirmhíniú an Bhunreachta go háirithe nuair a bhíonn forálacha an chosúla sa chásdlí sin Is uirlis an áisiúil í seo agus is léir ó athbhreithniú ar chásdlí na Cúirte seo gur féidir an cur chuige seo a ghlacadh i gcásanna ábhartha Déantar tagairt mhór go háirithe in aighneachtaí scríofa an fhreagróra do chásdlí Cheanada agus don bhealach ar tugadh faoi na dualgais bunreachtúla a gearradh ansin maidir le teanga agus aird ar ndóigh ar a chomhthéacs polaitiúil áirithe agus ar Chairt um Chearta Cheanada Cé go nglacaim leis go bhféadfadh sé gur cur chuige iomchuí é seo i gcuid mhaith cásanna nílim go hiomlán cinnte ag an am céanna go gcuidíonn gairm chásdlí den sórt sin ó dhlínsí eile cosúil le Ceanada nó go deimhin ó thíortha analógacha eile cosúil mar shampla leis an mBeilg nó an Afraic Theas linn teacht ar thuairim cheart maidir le léirmhíniú a fháil ar na ceanglais teanga áirithe nó na dualgais a éiríonn ó Airteagal 25 4 4 nó ó Airteagal 8 den Bhunreacht sa chás seo Is soiléirseach an rud é i gcás teanga b fhéidir níos mó arís ná mar atá i gceist i gcás aon cheist chultúrtha eile go bhféadfadh na comhthéacsanna sóisialta polaitiúla agus nó stairiúla a bheith agus gur minic leo a bheith an difriúil ag brath ar na himthosca áirithe a eascraíonn ag aon am faoi leith nuair a ghlactar le bunreachtanna agus go deimhin ag brath ar theanga na n ionstraimí bunreachtúla féin Anuas air sin is annamh a dhéantar Bunreachtanna a dhréachtú sa teanga ceannann céanna i ndlínsí difriúla agus i ndeireadh na dála ar ndóigh is í an teanga a úsáidtear sa Bhunreacht an ceann is tábhachtaí ar fad agus nach mór a léamh sa chomhthéacs ar leith Ní dóigh liom go n athraíonn úsáid an téarma ar théarmaí nach lú a mbuntáiste ar aon bhealach na conclúidí ar ar tháinig mé maidir leis na dualgais bunreachtúla a thagann chun cinn I ndiaidh dom fáil amach nach bhfuil ceanglas ar bith ann faoin mBunreacht aistriúchán comhuaineach a dhéanamh ar Bhille a dhéantar a thíolacadh i dteanga amháin sa teanga oifigiúil eile cuimsíonn forálacha Acht 2003 i mo thuairim comhlíonadh dóthanach le haon dualgas bunreachtúil arna háitiú bunaithe ar an bhfrása ar théarmaí nach lú a mbuntáiste Ní thugann na cinntí in Ó Beoláin v Fahy supra tacaíocht d argóint an fhreagróra go gcuireann Airteagal 25 4 4 nuair a léitear é in éineacht le hAirteagal 8 den Bhunreacht dualgas aistriúchán comhuaineach a dhéanamh ar Acht Oireachtais go Gaeilge áit a shíníonn an tUachtarán é ina dhlí i leagan Béarla Táim sásta chomh fada is a bhaineann sé le hAchtanna an Oireachtais nach n aimsítear an dualgas atá á háitiú maidir le haistriúchán comhuaineach trí Airteagal 8 a léamh in éineacht le hAirteagal 25 4 4 den Bhunreacht Ionstraimí Reachtúla Tá sé beartaithe agam déileáil le hIonstraimí Reachtúla ar bhonn ginearálta agus níos déanaí le Rialacha na Cúirte a thagann freisin faoi cheannteideal Ionstraimí Reachtúla ach a gcaithfear ar na cúiseanna a luaim thíos caitheamh leo astu féin i gcomhthéacs na n imeachtaí seo Ina bhreithiúnas ar an gceist a bhaineann le hIonstraimí Reachtúla dúirt an breitheamh Ard Chúirte léannta While the Statutory Instruments are not spelt out in the Act of 2003 and as O Beolain v Fahy held in favour of an obligation to translate Acts and Rules of Court it would seem to me to be an impediment inhibition on the Plaintiff if the S I s were not translated Dar le haighneachtaí scríofa an fhreagróra áitítear gur ghlac abhcóide na n achomharcóirí leis ar an gcéad lá a éisteadh an cás os comhair an bhreithimh Ard Chúirte léannta go raibh dualgas orthu Achtanna an Oireachtais agus Ionstraimí Reachtúla a chur amach agus a chur ar fáil sa dá theanga oifigiúla ach nár aontaigh siad leis an bhfreagróir maidir le cathain ba chóir é sin a dhéanamh Áitítear ina theannta sin thar a cheann toisc go ndearna an breitheamh Ard Chúirte léannta a bhreithiúnas bunaithe ar a chonclúid go bhfuil Achtanna agus Ionstraimí Reachtúla fite fuaite ina chéile agus nach féidir iad a scaradh óna chéile agus nach bhfuil ciall ar bith leis mar sin Achtanna a aistriú gan na hIonstraimí Reachtúla a rinneadh faoi na hAchtanna a aistriú freisin Deir an freagróir go ndearnadh cinneadh an bhreithimh Ard Chúirte léannta i gceart bunaithe ar bhreithiúnas na Cúirte seo in Ó Beoláin v Fahy supra agus áitíonn sé agus aird aige ar an méid dlí atá ar fáil trí mheán Ionstraimí Reachtúla ar a n áirítear iad sin a leasaíonn Achtanna an Oireachtais nach féidir teacht ar aon idirdhealú dleathach idir a person s right ceart an duine mar a ghlaonn an freagróir air gach Ionstraim Reachtúil a bheith ar fáil mar aon le gach Acht i nGaeilge agus níl ciall ná réasún le haon hiarracht a déantar idirdhealú den sórt sin a dhéanamh Tosnaíonn na hachomharcóirí ina gcuid aighneachtaí scríofa trí shéanadh gur ghéill siad go raibh aon dualgas ann Ionstraimí Reachtúla a aistriú le linn éisteacht na hArd Chúirte nó go raibh an éisteacht teoranta i dtaca le hargóint maidir le cathain ba chóir an dualgas sin a chomhlíonadh Deir siad go ndearna an Fógra Cur i gCoinne na mionnscríbhinní a comhdaíodh agus na haighneachtaí scríofa ar fad a rinneadh san Ard Chúirt agóid i gcoinne aon dualgas den sórt sin agus deir siad go dúirt abhcóide sinsearach thar ceann an achomharcóra ar an 7ú Nollaig 2004 nach bhféadfadh sé aontú leis go raibh a leithéid de ghéilleadh déanta riamh aige agus go raibh treoracha aige seasamh an achomharcóra a dhearbhú agus a dheimhniú don chúirt Ba é an seasamh sin ná nár ghlac siad leis go raibh aon dualgas bunreachtúil ann aon cheann de na hIonstraimí Reachtúla nó iad ar fad a aistriú Áitíonn siad nach dtacaíonn athscríbhinn éisteacht na hArd Chúirte leis go raibh aon ghéilleadh den sórt sin ann agus tarraingíonn siad aird na Cúirte seo ar an bhfíoras nach ndéanann an breithiúnas réamhaithris in aon áit ar a leithéid

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  • bhí i gceist i gcúis Delap i mbreithiúnas eile i gcúis Ní Cheallaigh v An tAire Comhshaoil 1980 1998 Tuairiscí Speisialta 52 mar seo leanas Cinnte bhí gnó oifigiúil de chuid an Stáit i gceist ach ina theannta san se bhí i gceist ná an ceart atá ag gach saoránach fén mBunreacht rochtain a bheith aige ar na Cúirteanna d fhonn a chearta a dhearbhú agus a chosaint Ar an ábhar sin bhíos den bharúil go mbeadh sárú dá dhéanamh ar an gceart san muna gcuirfi Rialacha na n Uas Chúirteanna ar fáil san da theanga oifigiúil D aontaigh an breitheamh léannta Árd Chúirte le O hAnluain B ins an dá chás thuas luaite Phlé sí leis an ábhar go bunbhriach mar cheist ionannais mar a dhein O hAnluain B i gcúis Delap Dúirt sí 1 7 Sí mo thuairim go bhfuil dualgas ar an Stát de réir forléiriú cruinn Alt 34 3 1 ag imoibrú le Alt 40 3 1 i gcomhthéacs Alt 8 tiontú oifigiúil Rialacha 1997 a chur ar fáil laistigh de thréimhse réasúnta tar éis don Freagróir sa tríú áit thuasluaite glacadh leo sa leagan Béarla agus go bhfuil ceart comhaoibhneasach neamháirithe Bearsanta ag an saoránach faoi Alt 40 3 1 go gcomhlíonfar an dualgas sin Ach thug Laffoy B suntas do nuair a tháinig an t ábhar os comhair na hÁrd Chúirte nach raibh teipithe fós ar an Stát a dhualgas maidir leis na Rialacha Cúirte Dúiche a chomhlíonadh Is ar an 24 Feabhra 1997 a shínigh an tAire na rialacha agus is cáipéis an fhada é ina bhfuil míle céad agus nócha leathanach Cuireadh chuig an bpríomh aistritheoir é ar an 25 Márta 1997 Thosaigh imeachta an Iarratasóir ar an 19 Márta 1998 agus tugadh breithiúnas ins an Árd Chúirt ar an 17 Meitheamh 1999 Dá bhárr seo ba cheart tuilleadh ama a thabhairt don Stát le aistriúchán na rialacha a chríoclmú Dúirt an breitheamh léannta áfach go raibh sé fíor phráinneach go rachfaí i mbun na h oibre agus go gcríochnófar é chomh luadh agus a b fhéidir sin Maidir le triáil an Iarratasóra féin ós comhair na Cúirte Dúiche dúirt Laffoy B go mbeadh ar na Cúirteanna gach iarracht a dhéanamh chun na deachrachtaí a d fhéadfadh a theacht i gcoinne dlíthigh ar mhian leo a ngnó a dhéanamh i nGaeilge a laghdú agus deireadh a chur leo nó go mbeadh fáil ar aistriúchán oifigiúil ar Rialacha 1997 Dá réir sin dhiúltaigh an breitheamh léannta an faóiseamh a d iarr an tIarratasóir Tá achomharc déanta ag an Iarratasóir i gcoinne an bhreithiúnais seo agus i gcoinne an órdú Is mar seo atá a fhorais achomhairc leagtha amach ins an bhFógra Achomharc 1 Go ndeachaigh an Breitheamh léannta amú ó thaobh an dlí de i Nuair a chinn sí go raibh sé intuigthe ó Airteagal 25 den Bhunreacht go mbeadh tréimhse réasúnach ag an Stát tar éis achtú bille chun tiontú oifigiúil de a chun ar fáil ii Nuair a d aontaigh sí go raibh dualgas ar an Stát ionstraimí reachtúla a chun ar fáil sa Phríomh theanga oifigiúil ar choinníoll go mbeadh tréimhse réasúnach aige chun an dualgas sin a chomhlíonadh iii Nuair a d aontaigh sí go raibh dualgas ar an Stát ionstraimí reachtúla a chun ar fáil sa Phríomh theanga Oifgiúil ar choinníoll nach raibh an lonstraim i gceist ró fhada iv Nuair a chinn sí go mba leigheas é ar leagan Gaeilge de The Rules of the District Court gan a bheith ar fáil dá ndéanfadh breithiúna agus oifigigh na Cúirte Dúiche gach iarracht chun gach deacracht a bheidh ar an Iarratasóir Achomhracóir agus gach constaic a bheidh sa bhealach air de dheasca an tiontú réamhráite gan a bheith ar fáil a laghdú agus a chealú 2 Go ndeachaigh an Breitheamh léannta amú ó thaobh na bhfioras do i Nuair a chinn sí nach raibh tréimhse réasúnach ag a Stát nuair a bhí ní ba mhó ná dhá bhliain aige ii Nuair a chinn sí go raibh lonstraim Reachtúíl Uimhir 93 1997 ró fhada go n aistreófaí i laistigh de dhá bhliain iii Nuair a chinn sí nach bhfuil agus nach mbeidh constaic ar bith sa bhealach ar an Iarratasóir Achomhracóir agus nach sárófaí a chearta bunreachtúla de dheasca tiontú oifigiúil de The Rules of the District Court gan a bheith ar fáil Aighneacht Abhcóide Thagair Séamus Ó Tuathail Abhcóide Sinsear an Iarratasóra Achomharcach go na hAirteagail den Bhunreacht a phléann go díreach leis an teanga Ghaeilge Pléann Airteagal 8 leis an teanga go ginearálta Tá a thioncar maidir le imeachtaí Cúirte soiléirithe ag an gCúirt Uachtarach i gcúis Ó Monacháin v An Taoiseacla 1986 ILRM 660 Glacadh leis sa chás sin go raibh an prionsabal é a bheith de cheart ag dlíthi go n éistfí a chás i nGaeilge teoranta Ceart a bhí ann taobh an dlíthigh féin a chur i nGaeilge Ní raibh aon cheart ann tabhairt ar dhaoine eile an teanga Gaeilge a úsáid Ghlac an tUasal Ó Tuathail leis cé go raibh sé de cheart ag an Iarratasóir a chuid imeachtaí Cúirte féin a reachtáil i nGaeilge nach raibh sé de chead aige tabhairt ar dhaoine eile a bhí sáite ins na h imeachtaí an teanga Ghaeilge a úsáid Da mba gá sin chaifí teangaire a chur ar fáil D áitigh sé áfach nar mhór do Rialacha na Cúirte Dúiche i nGaeilge agus na foirmeacha atá leo a bheith aige le go stiúrfadh sé cosaint iomlán sa Chúirt Dúkhe scairt ar fhinnéithe fógraí achomharc a chomhadú agus nithe eile Maidir le Achta an Oireachtais lua an tUasal Ó Tuathail Airteaga125 4 4 den Bhunreacht a deireann 1 gcás an tUachtarán do chur a láimhe le téacs Bille i dteanga de na teangacha oifigiúla agus sa teanga sin amháin ní foláir tiontú oifigiúil a chur amach sa teanga oifigiúil eile Ó 1980 i leith ar seisean theip go sonrach agus go callánach ar an Stát a dhualgas bunreachtúil a chomhlíonadh Ins an Árd Chúirt rialadh Laffoy B go gcaifí tréimhse réasúnach a thabhairt don Stát chun an dá Acht Oireachtais agus Rialacha na gCúirteanna Dúiche a aistriú Maidir leis na Reachtaí ní dhearna Airteaga1 25 4 4 aon tagairt in aon chor do taobh istigh de thréimhse réasúnach nó do aon leagan cainte dá chineál Dualgas a bhí ann an obair a dhéanamh ar an toirt Bhí focla an Airteagail soiléar agus ba chóir glacadh leo de réir bun bhrí na bhfocal Thagair sé do bhreithiúnas O Higgins C J i People DPP v O Shea 1982 IR 384 inar dhúirt a Príomh Bhreitheamh léannta leathanach 397 den tuairisc The Constitution as the fundamental law of the State must be accepted interpreted and construed according to the words which are used and these words where the meaning is plain and unambiguous must be given their literal meaning Plain words must be given their plain meaning unless qualified or restricted by the Constitution itself Dúirt an tUasal Ó Tuathail go raibh sé soiléir gur séard a bhí i gceist in Airteagal 25 4 4 ná go mbeadh na Reachtaí ar fáil i mBéarla agus i nGaeilge don phobal Bhíodar ar fáil mar sin go dtí 1978 Ins an tréimhse ó 1937 go dti 1978 is cosúil go an leagan Gaeilge le linn don téacs Béarla a bheith dá mheas dá leasú agus dá rith i dTithe an Oireachtas Le fiche bliain áfach níor cuireadh aon aistriúchán ar fáil munar chuir duine éigin go tréan in aghaidh gan aistriúchán a bheith ar Acht áirithe Dúirt sé nach bhféadfaí failí agus neamh chúram fiche bliain a mhaitheamh tré aistriúchán dheifreach dena Reachtaí a bhí de dhíth a chur ar fáil ar an noiméad déannach sa chás seo nó in aon chás aonair eile Ba cheart don Chúirt a rá go soiléir é a bheith de dhualgas ar an Stát na h aistriúcháin a bhí de dhíth a chur ar fáil mar atá leagtha amach san mBunreacht Ghlac Abhcóide an Iarratasóra leis nar bhain Airteaga1 25 4 4 le Ionstraimí Reachtúil Cé gur mhian sé gur chóir gach Ionstraim Reachtúil a flioillsiú ins an dá theanga oifigiúil ghlac sé leis go bhféadfadh deacrachtaí praiticiúla a bheith ann i gcur ar fáil aistriúcháin ar lear mór cáipéisi Ach maidir leis an gcás láithreach chuir sé béim ar an ngá práinneach a bhí ann don Iarratasoir agus dá chomairleoirí dlí leagan Gaeilge a bheith ar fáil de rialacha nua aoiseach na Cúirte Dúiche Thug sé suntas dó gur foillsíodh Rialacha na Cúirte Dúíche 1948 i mBéarla agus i nGaeilge Bhí sé de cheart ag saoránach ar bith a chás nó a cás a riaradh ins an teanga Gaeilge Is cearta tréana socraithe bunreachtúla an ceart dul chun na Cúirteanna agus an ceart triáil chothrom a fháil Is cearta iad a bhfuil glactha leis ord thosuíocht a bheith ann i measc cearta bunreachtúla Is cuid lárnach den cheart dul chun na cúirteanna agus triáil chothrom a fháil go mbeadh fáil ar Rialacha na cúirte i dteanga an té a bhfuil liamhaintí ina leith Ins an gcomhtéacs sin thagair an tUasal Ó Tuathail do na cearta atá leagtha amach in Airteagal 6 den Choinbhinsin Eorpach um Chearta Daonna Chuir Abhcóide an Iarratasóra a mhuinín i mbreithiúnas Ó hAnluain B in Delap v An tAire Dlí agus Cirt 1980 1998 IR Tuairisci Speisialta 46 agus le na ais breithiúnas an bhreitheamh léannta chéanna in Stát Mac Fhearraigh v An Breitheamh Dúíche Neilan 1980 1998 IR Tuairisci Speisialta 38 agus thagair sé do na píosaí as na breithiúnais sin a lua Laffoy B ina bhreithiúnas Chuir sé in iúl freisin an leagan amach céanna a bheith ag Ó hAnluain B i leith foirmeacha reachtúla faoi Achta Comhlachtaí i gcás Ó Murchú v Cláraítheoir na gCuideachtaí 1980 1998 IR Tuairisci Speisialta 42 Ins an cás sin bhí an tIarratasóir ag iarradh eagras den ainm Comhar na Muinteoiri Gaeílge a chorprú agus a chlárú mar chuideachta theoranta Chun seo a dhéanamh d iarr sí ar Oifig na gCuideachtaí na foirmeacha cuí ins an teanga Gaeilge Ni raibh siad ar fáil Tar éis moill agus deacracht i gcur na bhfoirmeacha ar fáil di chur sí tús le imeachta ins an Árd Chúirt chun iachail a chur ar Chláraitheoir na gCuideachtaí na foirmeacha cuí a sholathar di Mhol an Freagróir sa chás sin mar a bhí dá mholadh sa chás seo go bhféadfadh an tIarratasóir a h aistriúchán féin de na foirmeacha a sholáthar Dhiúltaigh Ó hAnluain B don mholadh seo agus dúirt sé leathanach 44 Dá mba rud é gur ghlac sí leis an gcomhairle sin do bhéadh uirthi an stró agus an dua a bhainfeadh le saothar an aistriúcháin do ghlacadh uirthi féin nó b fhéidir táille d íoc le duine a bhéadh níos oilte ná í féin i gcúrsaí dlí agus teangan agus ar deireadh báire ní bhéadh a fhios aici an mbéadh an hláraitheoir sásta go raibh an leagan a chuirfi os a chomhair ar aon dul leis an leagan oifigiúil atá le fáil sa Sceideal agus atá ar fáil gan dua don té atá toilteanach an leagan Béarla d úsáid Tá sé soiléir gur caitheadh airgead Stáit ar na foirmeacha sa leagan Béarla do chur ar fáil ar an gcuma san agus ní feictear dhom go bhfuil cothrom na Féinne le fáil ag an gcuid sin den phobal gur mian leo an gnó a dhéanamh tré mheán an phrímh theanga oifigiúil muna gcuirtear na háiseanna céanna ar fáil dóibh sin freisin Mar fhocal deireannach dúirt an tUasal Ó Tuathail go fiú is dá nglacadh an Chúirt seo le cinneadh Laffoy B gur cheart tréimhse réasunta a thabhairt leis na rialacha a aistriú agus nach raibh deireadh leis an tréimhse sin ar lá a breithiúnais bhí bliain caite anois ó thug Laffoy B a breithiúnas Ni raibh aon chomhthara ann ón Stát go raibh an obair aistriúcháin tosaithe gan bacadh le é a bheith críochnaithe Dá mba rud é nar tugadh a faoiseamh a bhí dá lorg aige don Iarratasóir bhí sé soiléir nach ndéanfadh na Freagróirí a dhath Phléigh Abhcóide Sinsear na bhFreagróirí Maurice Gaffney i dtús báire le ceist aistriúcháin na nAcht um Trácht ar Bóithre D admhaigh sé de bharr Airteaga1 25 4 4 den Bhunreacht go raibh sé de dhulagas ar an Stát aistriúchán oifigiúil a sholáthar ar aon Bhille a bhí sínithe ag an Uachtarán i dteanga amháin den dá theanga oifigiúil D aontaigh sé nach raibh aon teora ama ar sholáthar a leithéid de aistriúchán ins an mBunreacht ach dúirt sé gur cheart glacadh as seo go mbeadh tréimhse réasúnach ar fáil leis an aistriúchán a sholáthar Ba chir cúinsí ax nós ganntanas aistritheoirí nó easpa achmhainní a chur san áireamh D áitigh sé freisin nach ar na Freagróirí a bhí an dualgas sa chás seo aistriúchán na Reachtaí a sholáthar ach ar Thithe an Oireachtais agus gur dualgas é go h áirithe a Chléireach na Dála Ins an aighneacht seo bhí sé ag braith ar Ordú 17 3 de Bhuan Órdaithe Dáil Éireann a deir Cuirfidh an Cléireach faoi deara go ndéanfar tiontú oifigiúil go Béarla ar gach dlí dá n achtaíonn an tOireachtas sa Ghaeilge agus tiontú oifigiúil go Gaeilge ar gach dlí dá n achtaíonn an tOireachtas sa Bhéarla Dúirt an tUasal Gaffney gur chuid de fhoireann riaracháin Thíthe an Oireachtais a bhí riamh Rannóg an Aistriúcháin an rannóg a rinne aistriúcháin ar na Reachta thar na mblianta Ar aon nós dúirt an tUasal Gaffney nach raibh anois ach ceist inargóinte nó inphléite in éileamh an Iarratasóra ar sholáthar aistriúcháin oifigiúla de na hAchtanna um Thrácht ar Bhóithre mar go raibh aistriúcháin ar an dá Acht curtha ar fáil Mar sin de ní raibh aon riachtanas ann don Chúirt aon órdú a dhéanamh maidir leis an ghné sin den chás Maidir le Rialacha na Cúirte Dúiche ní raibh sé iomlán soiléir ar admhaigh na Freagróirí i ndáiríre a bheith de dualgas cinte ar an Stát aistriúchán ar na rialacha a sholáthar Ach ó tharla gur rialaigh an breitheamh Árd Chúirte léannta go raibh a leithéid de dualgas ann agus nar chuir na Freagróirí achomharc ina aghaidh sin sé mo bharúil go bhfuil ar an gCúirt seo glacadh leis go n aontaíonn na Freagróirí go bhfuil sé de oibleagáid ar an Stát aistriúchán a sholáthar Ach ba soiléar nach raibh aon iarracht á dhéanamh an t aistriúchán seo a chur ar fáil mar ghnó práinneach nó é a chur ar fáil in am do thriáil an Iarratasóra Is léir go soiléar leagan amach na bhFreagróirí ar an tréimhse réasúnta ar thagair Laffoy B dó a bheith soshínte Déanann an tUasal Gaffney idirdhealú freisin idir cás Delap agus an cás seo mar gur attornae é an tUasal Delap agus dá bharr sin go mbeadh leagan Gaeilge de Rialacha na nUaschúirteanna ag teastáil uaidh go rialta b fhéidir go laethúil ina chuid oibre Is gnáth bhaill den phobal é an tIarratasóir seo a bhí san am ag déileáil le liamhúint ina choinne sa Chúirt Dúiche Cheana féin tugadh na caipéisí cuí dó ina phlé leis an Gárda Síochána tugadh leagan Gaeilge de na Reachtaí cuí dó dá mba rud é mar shámpla gur theastaigh uaidh fios a chur ar fhínnéithe níl amhras ann ach go bhfuil ar a chumas féin agus a chomhairleóirí dlí a n aistriúcháin féin de na foirmeacha atá ins na Rialacha a chur ar fáil I ndeireadh báire dúirt an tUasal Gaffney nach raibh éileamh an Iarratasóra an Ordú Toirmisc deá bhunaithe Níl tosaíocht ag ceart an Iarratasoir ar leagan Gaeilge de Rialacha na Cúirte Dúíche ar cheart an phobail coireanna a ionchúisiú Ní raibh aon fhianaise ann i ndáiríre nach bhfuigheadh an tlarratasóir triáil chothrom de bhrí nach raibh fáil ar leagan Gaeilge de na Rialacha Chinn an breitheamh léannta Árd Chúirte nach sárófaí cearta bunreachtúla an Iarratasóra agus nach gcuirfí aon constaici ina bhealach ag a thriáil ins an gCúirt Dúíche D áitigh an tUasal Gaffney gur chóir don Chúirt seo seasamh le breith na hÁrd Chúirte CONCLÚIDÍ a Na Reachtaí Forálann Airteaga1 25 den Bhunreacht mar leanas Airteagal 25 1 Chumh luath agus a ritear Bille seachas Bille a luaitear a bheith ina Bhille a bhfuil togra ann chun an Bunreacht seo a leasú nó a mheastar é a bheith rite ag dhá Theach an Oireachtais ní foláir don Taoiseach an Bille sin a thairiscint don Uachtarán chun a lámh a chur leis agus chun é a fhógairt ina dhlí de réir forálacha an Airteagal seo 2 1 Taobh amuigh de chás dá socraítear a mhalairt leis an mBunreacht seo gach Bille a thairgtear don Uachtarán mar sin chun a lámh a chur leis agus chun é a fhógairt ina dlí ní foláir dó a lámh a chur leis lá nach luaithe ná an cúigiú lá agus nach déanaí ná an seachtú lá tar éis an lae a thairgtear an Bille dó 2 2 Ar achainí an Rialtais le comhthoil Sheanad Eireann roimh ré tig leis an Uachtarán a lámh a chur le haon Bhille is siocair don achainí sin níos luaithe ná an cúigiú lá tar éis an dáta réamhráite 3 Gach Bille a ndearnadh an tréimhse chun a bhreithnithe ag Seanad Éireann a ghiorrú faoi Airteagal 24 den Bhunreacht seo ní foláir don Uachtarán a Zámh a chur Zeis an Zá a thairgtear an Bille sin dó chun é a fhógairt ina dhlí 4 1 Déanann dlí de gach Bille an lá a chuireann an tUachtarán a lámh leis faoin mBunreacht seo agus is dlí é an lá sin agus ón lá sin amach agus mura léir a mhalairt d intinn ina thaobh is é an lá sin a thagann sé i ngníomh 4 2 Gach Bille a gcuireann an tUachtarán a lámh leis faoin mBunreacht seo ní foláir dó é a fhógairt ina dlí le fógra san Iris Oifgiúil faoi ordú uaidh á rá go bhfuil an Bille ina dhlí 4 3 Is é téacs de Bhille a gcuirfidh an

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  • here is for the interpretation of Article 4 The declaration by the Constitution that the National Language of the Saorstát is the Irish language does not mean that the Irish language is or was at that historical moment universally spoken by the people of the Saorstát which would be untrue in fact but it did mean that it is the historic distinctive speech of the Irish people that it is to rank as such in the nation and by implication that the State is bound to do everything within its sphere of action as for instance in State provided education to establish and maintain it in its status as the national language and to recognise it for all official purposes as the national language There is no doubt in my mind but that the term national in the Article is wider than but includes official in which respect only the English language is accorded Constitutional equality None of the organs of the State legislative executive or judicial may derogate from the pre eminent status of the Irish language as the national language of the State without offending against the Constitutional provisions of Article 4 Measaim go mbaineann tuiscint an iar Phriomh Bhreithimh léannta ar an téarma náisiúnta national mar théarma atá níos leithne ná an téarma oifigiúil official ach a thugann an chiall sin san áireamh chomh maith céanna le hAirteagal 8 Go deimhin tá sé soiléir sa téacs forlámhach Gaeilge den Bhunreacht gur óna stádas mar theanga náisiúnta a eascraíonn stádas na Gaeilge mar an phriomhtheanga oifigiúil Leanann an tuiscint seo ón bhfocal cúisíoch ós sa téacs forlámhach Creidim gur cuí d fhorléiriú Airteagal 8 freisin an impleacht a chuireaun an Príomh Bhreitheamh Kennedy i dtéacs Bhunreacht 1922 go bhfuil oibleagáid cheangailteach ar an Stát i leith na teanga sna téarmaí a leagann sé amach Creidim go dtionscnaíonn Airteagal 8 taobh amuigh d aon éifeacht eile is féidir a bheith aige ordaitheach Bunreachtúil nach mór do na cúirteanna a mheá agus iad ag déileáil le cás den chineál seo Aontaím le breithiúnas Ó hAnluain B in Ó Murchú v Cláraitheoir na gCuideachtaí agus an tAire Tionscal agus Tráchtála 1988 LR S R 1980 1998 42 nuair a dúirt sé Táim den bharúil go bhfuil forálacha Airteagal 8 de Bhunreacht na hÉireann níos treise maidir leis an aitheantas a thugtar don Ghaeilge mar phríomhtheanga oifigiúil an Stáit na mar a bhí Airteagal 4 de Bhunreacht an tSaorstáit Is suimiúil cuimhneamh nuair a bhí Airteagal 8 den dréacht Bhunreacht á phlé ar 25 Bealtaine 1937 ag Dáil Éireann mar Choiste gur diúltaíodh do thogra go mbronnfaí comhstádas náisiúnta agus oifigiúil ar an mBéarla Agus é ag míniú an téarma náisiúnta national sa chomhthéacs seo dúirt an tUasal De Valera It the Irish language is the language most associated with this nation the language that is in accordance with the traditions of our people We are a separate people and our language was spoken until a little over one hundred years ago generally by our people Dáil Éireann 25 Bealtaine 1937 colún 987 Dá réir sin glacadh leis an leagan atá ann faoi láthair d Airteagal 8 lena chur os comhair an phobail Rinneadh stádas na teanga a mheá go hindíreach i gCúirt Bhreithiúnais na gComhphobal Eorpach in Groener v An tAire Oideachais agus Coiste Gairmoideachais Chathair Átha Cliath cás 379 87 Breithiúnas 28 Samhain 1989 Thug Groener bean Ollannach agóid i gcoinne dhiúltú an Aire í a cheapadh mar léachtóir buan sa phéintéireacht i gColáiste Gairmoideachais ar an mbonn gur theip uirthi sa tástáil Ghaeilge Dúirt sí go raibh an riachtanas go bpasálfaí tástáil sa teanga i gcoinne fhiorálacha Dhlí na gComhphobal Eorpach i dtaca le saorghluaiseacht oibrithe Cuireadh an cás faoi bhráid na Cúirte Eorpaí faoi réir Airteagal 177 de Chonradh na Róimhe maidir le pointí áirithe ar a raibh is regard to be had to a policy of the Irish State that persons holding the post should have a competent knowledge of the Irish language where such knowledge is not required to discharge the duties attached to the post Ba é breith na Cúirte A permanent full time post of lecturer in public vocational education is a post of such a nature as to justify the requirement of linguistic knowledge within the meaning of regulation 1612 68 provided that the linguistic requirement is imposed as part of a policy for the promotion of the national language which is at the same ttme the first official language and provided that that requirement is applied in a proportionate and non discriminatory manner Is é mo thuairimse nach féidir an Ghaeilge arb í an teanga náisiúnta í agus san am céanna arb í príomhtheanga oifigiúil an Stáit i a eisiamh ar a laghad in éagmais dlí den chineál a shamhlaítear le hAirteagal 8 3 ó aon chuid de dhioscúrsa poiblí an náisiúin nó ó aon ghnó oifigiúil de chuid an Stáit nó de chuid aon cheann dá bhaill Ná ní féidir caitheamh léi sna comhthéacsanna seo ar shlí ar bith nach bhfuil chomh fabhrach leis an tslí a gcaitear leis an dara teanga oifigiúil Ná ní féidir iad siúd atá inniúil agus ar mian leo í a úsáid chun iad féin a chur in iúl nó chun cumarsáide a chosc nó a fhágáil faoi mhíbhuntáiste agus iad á dhéanamh sin in aon chomhthéacs náisiúnta nó oifigiúil IMEACHTAÍ CÚIRTE Éilíonn Airteagal 34 den Bhunreacht agus feictear ann gur i gCúirteanna amháin trí bhreithiúna a cheaptar ar an modh atá leagtha amach sa Bhunreacht ina suí go poiblí de ghnáth a riartar cúrsaí ceartais Is cuid iad cumhachtaí na mBreithiúna sin de na cumhachtaí a thagann ón bpobal faoi Airteagal 6 den Bhunreacht Is cuid de chumhacht an Rialtais é an chumhacht bhreithiúnach mar aon leis na cumhachtaí reachtaíochta agus feidhmeannais Leanann sé gur cuid den ní sin ar ar thug mé dioscúrsa poiblí an náisiúin agus gnó oifigiúil an Stáit iad tionscnamh cúisimh choiriúil más mionchúiseamh é nó eile ag oifigeach reachtúil agus breithniú tar éis sin ag Breitheamh Tá saoránach a thoghairmtear faoi phróis éigeantach a eisíodh i nGaeilge cé nach bhfuil an pointe seo bunúsach chun cúisearnh a fhreagairt sa Chúirt i dteideal go soiléir an freagra sin a thabhairt i nGaeilge más mian leis Ná ní féidir é a bheith faoi mhíbhuntáiste agus é á dhéanamh sin de bharr a rogha dlíthiúla teanga Thairis sin tá sé i dteideal a fhreagra a thabhairt i nGaeilge cibé acu a thuigeann sé Béarla nó nach dtuigeann Féach An Stát Mac Fhearraigh v Mac Gamhna 1984 I R S R 1980 1998 38 Rinneadh amach an toradh seo roimh ré go deimhin sa bhreith i bhfad níos luaithe in Attornev General v Joyce and Walsh 1929 IR 526 áit a ndúirt An Chúirt Achomhairc Choiriúil ag trácht ar dhaoine a thug fianaise i nGaeilge ag triail choiriúil The Irish language however is not merely the vernacular language of most if not all of the witnesses in question in the present case but holds a special position by virtue of the Constitution of the Saorstát in which its status is recognised and established as the national language of the Saorstát from which it follows that whether it be the vernacular language of a particular citizen or not if he is competent to use the language he is entitled to do so Therefore it may be said that all those who gave their evidence in the Irish language in the present case had as it were a double right to do so first on general principles of Natural Justice as their vernacular language and secondly as a matter of Constitutional right aibhsiú curtha leis Tá sé soiléir freisin ó chás Mac Fhearraigh nach féidir a ordú do dhlíthi ar mian leis a chás a phlé i nGaeilge ná iallach a chur air sin a dhéanamh i mBéarla ar chúinsí caoithiúlachta ná de bharr an ama bhreise a bheadh riachtanach chun a cheisteanna nó a aighneachtaí a aistriú ar son na ndaoine sin gan inniúlacht i nGaeilge Déileálann dhá chás eile go sonrach leis an gceart ar cháipéisi dlíthiúla a bheith ar fháil i nGaeilge In Ó Murchú v Cláraitheoir na gCuideachtaí agus an tAire Tionscal agus Tráchtála 1988 I R S R 1980 1998 42 ba mhian leis an Iarratasóir cuideachta a chorprú i nGaeilge Ní raibh na foirmeacha reachtúla riachtanacha ar fáil i nGaeilge áfach agus lorg sí Ordú Mandamus ag ordú do na Freagróirí iad a chur ar fáil Cuireadh na foirmeacha ar fáil ina dhiaidh sin agus ba é saincheist na gcostas an t aon saincheist sa chás D éiligh na húdaráis nach raibh sí i dteideal na gcostas ar an mbonn nach raibh oibleagáid ar an Stát na doiciméid a chur ar fáil i nGaeilge agus go bhféadfadh sí ar aon nós a haistriúchán féin a dhéanamh ar na foirmeacha ábhartha Dhámh Ó hAnluain B a costais ar an Iarratasóir agus dúirt sé Tá sé soiléir gur caitheadh airgead Stáit ar na foirmeacha sa leagan Béarla do chur ar fáil ar an gcuma san agus ní fheictear dhom go bhfuil cothrom na Férnne le fáil ag an gcuid sin den phobal gur mian leo an gnó a dhéanamh tré mheán an phrímh theanga oifigiúíl muna gcuirtear na háiseanna céanna ar fáil dóibh sin freisin Aontaím go hiomlán leis an dearcadh sin Cás a bhaineann go mór le hábhar an cháis seo faoi láthair is ea Delap v An tAire Dlí agus Cirt Éire agus an tArd Aighne 1990 I R S R 1980 1998 46 Ba rnhian leis an Uasal Delap Aturnae aistriúchán oifigiúíl de Rialacha na nUaschúirteanna a bheith ar fáil aige agus lorg sé Mandamus agus faoiseamh dearbhaithe Mar a tharla cuireadh in iúl don Chúirt ar deireadh go raibh aistriúchán á ullmhú Deonaíodh dearbhú den oibleagáid bhunreachtíúl atá ar an Stát leagan Gaeilge de na rialacha ábhartha a sholáthar Mhaígh Ó hAnluain B go raibh an ceart ag saoránach faoin mBunreacht a thaobh féin de chás ar bith a phlé i nGaeilge ach i gcomparáid leo siúd atá sásta a gcás a phlé i mBéarla go bhfuil a leithéid de shaoránach faoi mhíbhuntáiste mura bhfuil na rialacha cuí ar fáil i nGaeilge Aontaím le breithiúnas Ó hAnluain B in Delap agus leanfainn é go hómósach Aontaím go háirithe lena chur sios ar staid saoránaigh ar mian leis dul chun dlí san Ard Chúirt nó sa Chúirt Uachtarach i nGaeilge Tá sé de cheart aige fén mBunreacht a thaobh féin des na himeachta a riaradh go hiomlán as Gaeilge má s mian leis rogha do dhéanamh den phríomh theanga oifigiúil Táim den bharúil go bhfuil constaic mhór san mbealach roimhe má s mian leis an nGaeilge agus má tharlaíonn ag an am gcéanna nach bhfuil aon leagan oifigiúil ar fáil den dlí a gheibhtear ins na Rialacha maidir le riaradh na n imeachta nó des na foirmeacha a ghabhann leo agus nach bhfuil cothrom na Féinne le fáil aige sa chás san i gcomparáid leis an aicme den phobal a bhíonn lán tsásta an leagan Béarla d úsáid i gcónal Aontaím freisin le breithiúnas bhreithimh léannta na hArd Chúirte Laffoy B sa chás seo nuair a deir sí Táim ar aon intinn le Ó hAnluain B faoi éifeacht forálacha an Bhunreachta i leith na fíricí sa chás seo Sí mo thuairim go bhfuil dualgás ar an Stát de reir forléiriú cruinn 34 3 1 ag imoibrú le Alt 40 3 1 i gcómhthéacs Alt sic 8 tiontú oifigiúil Rialacha 1997 a chur ar fáil laistigh de threimhse réasúnta tar eis don Freagróir sa triú áit thuasluaite glacadh leo sa leagan Béarla agus go bhfuil ceart cómhaoibhneasach neamháirithe pearsanta ag an saoránach faoi Alt 40 3 1 go gcóimhlíonfar an dualgas sin Tabharfar faoi deara gur cuireadh béim láidir sa dá chás deiridh agus in Mac Fhearraigh ar cheart na ndaoine sin ar mhian leo a ngnó dlíthiúil a dhéanamh trí Ghaeilge go gcuirfí cóir orthu ar chomhchéim leis an gcóir a chuirfí orthu siúd ar mhian leo a leithéid a dhéanamh trí Bhéarla Ag cuimhneamh ar stádas na Gaeilge feictear domsa go bhfuil siad siúd ar mian leo í a úsáid i dteideal iomlán é sin a dhéanamh agus i dteideal gach áis atá riachtanach chur é a dhéanamh ar a laghad sa mhéid is atá áiseanna dá leithéid ar fáil dóibh siúd a úsáideann an dara teanga oifigiúil Le linn an achomhairc seo faoi láthair a éisteacht dhiúltaigh an tAbhcóide ar son an Stáit a thuairim a thabhairt bealach nó bealach eile faoin gceist an raibh an tIarratasóir i dteideal aistriúcháin oifigiúil de Rialacha na Cúirte Dúiche faoin dlí Feicfear i gcás Ó Murchú gur shéan an Stát go dearfach go raibh Ó Murchú i dteideal leagain Ghaeilge de na foirmeacha faoi Acht na gCuideachtaí Is é mo thuairimse nach bhfuil an dearcadh diúltach nó débhríoch seo ag an Stát ag teacht le stádas bunreachtúil na teanga náisiúnta le polasaí an Stáit féin le fada ná le ceart an tsaoránaigh ar chomhionannas faoin dlí Fágann sin breitheanna na Cúirte Uachtaraí Ó Dálaigh P B Kingsmill Moore agus Walsh B in Attarney General v Coyne and Wallace 1967 101 ILTR 17 le meá Sa chás sin i gcomhthéacs fógra a seirbheáladh i nGaeilge amháin go rabhthas chun ionchúiseamh a dhéanamh faoi na hAchtanna um Thrácht ar Bhóithre d fhorléirigh Kingsmill Moore B Airteagal 8 den Bhunreacht agus shainigh Walsh B gur aontaigh sé leis faoin bpointe seo mar seo a leanas It was argued for the Attorney General that the true meaning of the Article was that either languages sic might be used unless provision had been made by law that one language only was to be used for some one or more official purposes On consideration I consider this construction to be correct Feictear dom gurb é éifeacht an chinnidh seo ná go mbronnann sé ar dhuine cibé acu an oifigeach é nó nach ea an ceart ar rogha a dhéanamh cé acu de na teangacha oifigiúla a úsáidfidh sé d aon bheart oifigiúil ar leith Baineann an rogha sin lena thaobh féin den bheart ní féidir le haon duine rogha teanga a ordú do dhuine eile In Coyne and Wallace ba é an fhianaise gurbh iondúil i gcuid áirithe den tír fógraí go rabhthas chun ionchúiseamh a dhéanamh agus toghairmeacha a sheirbheáil i nGaeilge Ní fhéadfadh sé seo áfach ceart Cosantóra ar a chás a rith i mBéarla dá mba mhian leis a eisiamh Sa tslí chéanna féadfaidh Cosantóir é féin a chosaint i nGaeilge cé go mb fhéidir gur tionscnaíodh imeachtaí ina choinne i mBéarla Ó tharla téarmaí Airteagail 8 agus an polasaí oifigiúil dátheangachais a bhfuil an Stát geallta dó caithfidh an Stát úsáid ceachtar den dá theanga a éascú gan idirdhealú Tá sé ar neamhréir iomlán leis an dátheangachas dlíthe a chur ar fáil in aon teanga amháin agus ní dhéantar a leithéid go bhfios dom in aon tír dhátheangach eile Maidir le hábhar sonrach na Rialacha níl aon amhras orm gur dearbhriachtanas é leagan Gaeilge de Rialacha gach Cúirte le bheith chomh héifeachtach ag dul chun dlí i nGaeilge agus a bheifí i mBéarla Ba é an mórfhaillí ba mheasa ag dlíodóir ar bith é dul chun Cúirte gan eolas cuimsitheach ar na Rialacha Má tá níos mó ná caint dhíomhaoin le bheith sa cheart cothrom ar dhul chun dlí i nGaeilge agus i mBéarla mar Ghearánaí nó mar Chosantóir ní mór an t ábhar seo a chur ar fáil Beagnach seachtó bliain ó shin i gcás Ó Foghludha v McCIean a luadh thuas thrácht Kennedy PB ar an ngá a bhí le sraith iomlán de Rialacha na nUaschúirteanna ar leith ó agus éagsúil ó na rialacha a d fhág rialtas na Breataine Dúirt sé It is manifest that there must be a complete and self contained code of Rules of Court governing the whole procedure and practice of the High Court and the Supreme Court made as soon as circumstances will allow That code whenever it comes must be made in the Irish language as it will also be made in the English language and it must set out all the common forms in both languages Until this has been done we shall not have a vocabulary of the ordinary legal technical terms in the Irish language established and recognised in general use At present owing to the Rules of Court having been made only in English anyone who wishes to use the Irish language in legal proceedings must make a vocabulary of his own for the technical terms used in English a highly inconvenient state of affairs as his choice of equivalence may not be recognised by his opponents or by the officers of the Court aibhsiú curtha leis Is é mo thuairim go mbaineann an réasúnaíocht chéanna le Rialacha na Cúirte Dúiche Tá na Rialacha sin fiorthábhachtach mar a dúradh thuas le dul chun dlí sa Chúirt sin I dtaca le cionta achoimre a thriail tá forálacha iontu maidir le nithe rithábhachtacha ar nós seirbheáil cumhachtaí chun cur ar atráth cumhachtaí leasúcháin agus an éifeacht a bhíonn ag éagsúlachtaí idir an cion a líomhnaíodh sa toghairm agus an fhianaise iarbhír a tugadh sa Chúirt Chomh maith leis sin tugann na Rialacha na foirmeacha cuí atá le húsáid do ghnó bunúsach ar nós finné a thoghairm agus fógra achomhairc a thabhairt In éagmais leagain oifigiúil de na foirmeacha seo i nGaeilge d fhéadfadh finné míthoilteanach a gheobhadh toghairm i nGaeilge gan teacht i láthair agus dá ndéanfaí iarracht é a ordú d fhéadfadh sé a agóid nach raibh an toghairm sa bhfoirm cheaptha D fhéadfadh páirtí ar a seirbheálfaí fógra achomhairc pointe den chineál céanna a dhéanamh Arís ní mór doiciméad ina bhfuil toradh na hanailíse a rinne An Lia Bhiúró um Shábháilteacht ar Bhóithre má tá sé le bheith inghlactha mar fhianaise a bheith sa bhfoirm a ceapadh go reachtúil agus d fhéadfaí agóid i gcoinne aistriúcháin néamhreachtúil Nílim ag tabhairt aon tuairim maidir le bailíocht aon agóide mar a shamhlaítear thuas tá siad á lua chun na deacrachtaí breise a léiriú a d fhéadfadh a bheith sa tslí ar cheachtar páirtí a d fhéachfadh le dul chun dlí sa teanga náisiúnta in éagmais aistriúcháin oifigiúil ar Achtanna agus ar orduithe Is fiú cuimhneamh gur cuireadh aistriúchán Gaeilge ar fáil den leagan roimhe seo de Rialacha na Cúirte Dúiche a rinneadh i 1948 Is cosúil i dtaca leis seo mar a tharla i gcás na Reachtanna go bhfuil gannchion tromchúiseach i soláthar ábhar dlíthiúil i nGaeilge ón mbliain 1980 nó mar sin Ni féidir a rá ach gur teip é seo an t ordaitheach bunreachtúil in Airteagai 8 a chomhlíonadh teip nach leithscéal d aon sórt ina leith é an ganntanas foirne is cosúil atá in Oifig an Phriomh Aistritheora i dTithe an Oireachtais Taobh amuigh den ordaitheach bunreachtúil ar tagraíodh dó agus den ghá atá ann caitheamh le daoine ar mian leo an Ghaeilge a úsáid don ghnó oifigiúil ar chomhchéim leo siúd a úsáideann an Béarla níl cúrsaí mar atá siad faoi láthair ag teacht le polasaí an Stáit mar atá leagtha síos go dlíthiúil le mórán blianta Tá An tAcht Lucht Cleachtuithe Dlí Cáilíocht 1929 agus na codanna ábhartha de na hAchtanna Aturnaethe a lean é leagtha amach chun a chinntiú go mbeidh lucht cleachtaidh dlí cibé Aturnaethe ná Abhcóidí iad inniúil ar Ghaeilge a úsáid Is ó lucht gairme na dlí amháin a earcaítear breithiúna Mhaígh teideal fada An tAcht Téarmaí Dlíthiúla Gaeilge 1945 gurbh é a bhí ann ná Acht da udaru Iontsamhla caighdeanacha Gaeilge do thearmai airithe do chur ar fail chun críocha dlí agus do dheanamh socruithe chun foirmeacha agus fasaí dlithiula Gaeilge d fhoillsiu Agus é ag cur an Bhille i láthair dúirt an tAire Dlí agus Cirt an tUasal Ó Beolláin At present there is a diffculty in the way of any extensive use of the Irish language for legal purposes The whole of the law with the exception of the Constitution is contained in the English language only and numerous words and phrases used in the law have been given technical meanings as distint from the ordinary meaning by statutes and judicial decisions It is necessary to have corresponding technical terms in Irish in order that Irish may be used for legal purposes De bhun téarmaí an Achta rinneadh deich gcinn d Orduithe Téarmaí idir 1947 agus 1956 a thiomsaigh réimsí den dlí ó dhlí na coiriúlachta go dlí na gcuideachtaí go probháid agus go riarachán Tá siad bailithe anois sa bhfoilseachán foclóireachta Téarmaí Dlí Níos déanaí tugadh spreagadh oifigiúil trí mheán Bhord na Gaeilge do thaighde Fasach grúpa dlíodóirí ar cainteoirí Gaeilge iad agus iad ag cur a dtuarascála An Ghaeilge agus an Dlí i dtoll a chéile i 1986 Déanann Ordú 120 de Rialacha na nUaschúirteanna 1986 soláthar d ateangairí a bheith ceangailte leis na hUaschúirteanna agus chun Mionnscríbhinni a chomhdófaí i gceachtar den dá theanga oifigiúil a aistriú go dtí an ceann eile ar iarratas ó aon duine nach dtuigeann an bhunteanga Níos déanaí fós san Acht um Sheirbhís Chúirteanna tá oibleagáid shonrach ar An Bord Seirbhísí Cúirteanna ceann a thabhairt do pholasaí an dátheangachais maidir le Seirbhísí Cúirte Éilíonn S 7 den Acht go ndéanfaidh an tSeirbhís nua pleananna straitéiseacha a ullmhú go rialta a dhéanfaidh d ceann a thabhairt do pholasaí an Rialtais i leith an dátheangachais agus go háirithe don ghá atá lena chinntiú go bhfuil líon sách mór den fhoireann ann a bhfuil ar a gcumas seirbhís a thabhairt sa Ghaeilge chomh maith leis an mBéarla aibhsiú curtha leis NA FÍRICÍ A LÉIRÍTEAR SA CHÁS SEO Ar neamhchead d fhorálacha an Bhunreachta a scrúdaíodh thuas agus don pholasaí comhsheasmhach reachtaíochta a léirítear sna hachtanna ar tagraíodh dóibh thar thréimhse seachtó bliain nach mór is eagal go léiríonn an cás seo faoi láthair teip maidir leis an ábhar is bunúsaí dá luaitear thuas a sholáthar Is le déanaí is measa an teip seo Tuigfidh aon duine a bhfuil teacht aige ar an reachtaíocht atá i gcló gur tréigeadh ó 1980 i leith an polasaí a bhí ann roimhe sin aistriúcháin oifigiúla a ullmhú d fhormhór mór na mbillí a ritear i mBéarla de réir mar a théann siad tríd na céimeanna bunreachtúla go dtí go bhfógraítear ina ndlí ar deireadh iad Níl ach lion nach fios go cinnte ach gur beag é de reachtanna ann a aistríodh ar an dóigh sin ó 1980 De réir fhianaise an cháis seo is de bharr ganntanais foirne agus brú oibre in Oifig Phríomh Aistritheora Thithe an Oireachtais atá cúrsaí mar atá Caithfidh gurb iad na hAchtanna um Thrácht ar Bhóithre na hachtanna is minicí a agraítear den chorpas iomlán reachtaíochta Is dócha go ndéantar na céadta míle cúiseamh faoi réir na nAchtanna sin gach bliain Ní cosúil áfach go ndearnadh iarracht ar bith an leagan nua den chód tráchta bóthair a aistriú agus níor aistríodh Achtanna 1994 agus 1995 ar deireadh go dtí gur thionscain an tIarratasóir seo faoi láthair a imeachtaí Caithfear béim a leagan air go bhfuil an polasaí táimhe seo go soiléir agus go hoscailte i gcoinne an tsainriachtanais atá in Airteagal 25 4 4 I gcás an tUachtarán do chur a láimhe le téacs Bille i dteanga de na teangacha oifigiúla agus sa teanga sin amháin ní foláir tiontú oifigiúil a chur amach sa teanga oifigiúil eile Nuair a cuireadh an méid seo ina leith san argóint le linn éisteacht an Achomhairc seo thug Abhcóide an Stáit dhá fhreagra iad araon neamhfhiúntach dar liom Ba é an chéad fhreagra cé go nglactar leis go bhfuil oibleagáid ann na hAchtanna a aistriú nach ndeir an Bunreacht cén uair atá sé sin le déanamh De réir na hargóna seo b fhéidir go nimeodh na blianta agus an Reachtaíocht atá i gceist á húsáid go laethúil gan aon aistriúchán a bheith ar fáil gan an Stát a bheith ag teip ina oibleagáid chomh fada is a bheadh sé i gceist dáiríre ag na húdaráis an t aistriúchán a chur ar fáil ar dháta éigin sa todhchaí Caithfidh go bhfuil sé soiléir nach réitíonn an argóint seo ar bhealach ar bith le stádas bunreachtúil na teanga náisiúnta ná leis an bpolasaí atá ann le fada maidir leis an dátheangachas i ngnó na gCúirteanna a cuireadh in iúl arís i bhfoirm reachtúil chomh déanach le 1996 I mo thuairimse caithfidh go bhfuil sé le tuiscint ó théarmaí Airteagal 25 4 4 go bhfuil ar a laghad an riachtanas ann an t aistriúchán oifigiúil a sholáthar chomh luath agus is féidir agus is soiléir go bhfuil ábhar maith argóna ann nach ndearnadh sa chás seo go gcaithfidh sé a bheith ar fáil sula dtugtar faoin Acht a chur i bhfeidhm ar dhuine atá inniúil agus ar mian leis a ghnóthaí oifigiúla a dhéanamh trí Ghaeilge Má fhorléirítear Airteagal 25 4 4 ina chomhthéacs bunreachtúil agus ar bhealach cuspóiriúil is soiléire fós an tuiscint seo Baineann Airteagal 25 leis na céimeanna trína bhfógraítear ina dhlí bille a ritheadh nó a mheastar a ritheadh in dhá Theach an Oireachtais Gnáthamh gasta é an gnáthamh atá leagtha síos De ghnáth nuair a thairgtear Bille don Uachtarán le síniú agus le fógairt ina dhlí bíonn sé le síniú idir cúig agus seacht lá tar éis a thairiscint Is féidir an tréimhse seo a laghdú ar na cúinsí a shamhlaítear in Airteagal 25 Díreach i ndiaidh na bhforálacha in Airteagal 25 4 2 agus 3 agus roimh an bhforáil in Airteagal 25 4 5 a fhorálann do théacs dlí a rollú chomh luath agus is féidir é tar éis a shíniú agus a fhógairt tarlaíonn an reacht is mó atá i gceist anseo ag foráil d aistriúchán oifigiúil Ina theannta sin is é an t aon chúis a d fhéadfaí a cheapadh leis an riachtanas atá ann aistriúchán oifigiúil a eisiúint ná go bhféadfadh na daoine sin arbh é a mian dleathach é a ngnó dlíthiúil a dhéanamh sa cheann sin de na teangacha oifigiúla nárbh í an teanga í inar ritheadh an Bille Ó tá siad i dteideal é sin a dhéanamh is léir go bhfuil sé miréasúnta sa ghnáthchiall agus sa chiall dhlíthiúil atá leis an téarma sin an t aistriúchán sin a choinneáil uathu ar feadh tréimhse ar bith ama agus cinnte ar feadh na mblianta agus fiú ar feadh deich nó scór de bhlianta nó breis mar a tharla faraor i gcás reachtanna iomadúla Is iomaí foráil reachtúil atá ann a chuireann oibleagáid ar an saoránach rudaí áirithe a dhéauamh ar iarratas ó dhuine atá ceaptha chuige Ceann de na cinn is coitianta díobh seo is ea an oibleagáid ainm agus seoladh a thabhairt do bhall den Gharda Síochána i gcúinsi áirithe Féach mar shampla Rannóg 107 den Acht um Thrácht ar Bhóithre 1961 forannóga 1 agus 4 a cheadaíonn do Gharda eolas a iarraidh agus nach leagann síos aon am sonrach chun géilleadh don iarratas béil seo Is féidir an argóint a shamhlú go furasta a dhéanfaí ar son an Stáit dá n éileodh saoránach go raibh sé i dteideal tréimhse uaireanta an chloig gan trácht ar mhíonna nó blianta a scaoileadh thart sula ngéillfeadh sé Ar an mbunús díreach céanna go gcaithfear focail reachtúla nó bunreachtúla a mhíniú i dtaca lena gciall agus lena gcuspóir follasach dhiúltóinn don tairiscint gur féidir leis an Stát moill ar feadh tréimhse éiginnte a chur ar sholáthar aistriúcháin oifigiúil ar Achtanna an Oireachtais Ba é an dara freagra a thug an tAbhchóide ar son an Stáit ná cé go raibh oibleagáid gan amhras ann aistriúchán oifigiúil ar Achtanna a chur ar fáil gur ar Thithe an Oireachtais amháin a bhí an oibleagáid seo Dúradh nach raibh Tithe an Oireachtais inchúisithe sna Cúirteanna as a ngníomh nó as a n éighníomh Mar sin cé go bhfuil oibleagáid ann aistriúchán oifigiúil a sholáthar ar an reachtaiocht go léir is ar aonán nach féidir a imphléadáil sna Cúirteanna a luíonn an oibleagáid sin Dá réir sin ní féidir an ceart ar aistriúchán oifigiúil a chur i bhfeidhm sa dlí Ní fhéadaim a rá ach gur olc agus gur tromchúiseach an airí í an argóint seo ar Údaráis Stáit atá ag obair faoin mBunreacht Is argóint i nach bhfuil fiúntas dá laghad inti fiú amháin ina cáil mar argóint Ní leagtar in áit ar bith sa Bhunreacht an oibleagáid ar Thithe an Oireachtais aistriúchán oifigiúil a chur ar fáil agus ní heol dom aon fhoráil reachtúil a dhéanann sin Is ríshoiléir ón gcomhfhreagras a taispeánadh sa chás seo gurbh é dearcadh an bhaill sin den Stát a ndeachaidh an tIarratasóir ina mhuinín agus é ag iarraidh aistriúcháin oifigiúil a fháil An Roinn Dlí agus Cirt gur gnó é an t aistriúchán don Roinn a mhol an reachtaíocht sa chás seo an Roinn Comhshaoil Is fior go luaitear sa dá théacs den Bhunreacht an oibleagáid atá ann aistriúchán oifigiúil a chur ar fáil gan trácht ar aon duine ná aon aonán ar a luíonn an oibleagáid seo Aistriúchán oifigiúil atá le cur ar fáil áfach Tá sé le tuiscint uaidh seo go luíonn an oibleagáid ar dhuine a bhfuil post aige mar oifigeach in oifig éigin agus feictear dom go bhfuil sé sin ag teacht leis an dearcadh a chuir an Roinn Dlí agus Cirt in iúl gurb í an oifig atá i gceist ná oifig an Aire a thug isteach an Bille Más mar seo atá ar ndóigh ní ionann sin agus a rá gur gá gur san oifig sin a d ullmhófaí an t aistriúchán ná fiú gúr státseirbhíseach nó seirbhíseach poiblí a dhéanfadh an t aistriúchán tá an fhoclaíocht ag teacht go hiomlán leis an aistriúchán a dhéanamh ar bhonn conartha nó eile fad is a dhéanfaí é a fhaomhadh go hoifigiúil Chuaigh an tAbhcóide ar son an Stáit i muinín théarmaí ghnáthrialacha Dháil Éireann 1986 mar thaca lena aighneachtaí Ní dhearnadh an aighneacht seo san Ard Chúirt Language is teideal d Ordú 17 agus forálann sé mar leanas 17 1 All proceedings in the Dáil shall be conducted through the medium of the Irish or the English language 2 The order paper the journal of proceedings of the Dáil and all other appropriate documents shall be issued in the Irish and English languages 3 The clerk shall cause to be made an official translation into the English language of every law enacted by the Oireachtas in Irish and an official translation into Irish of every law enacted by the Oireachtas in English Ní fheictear dom go scaoileann sé an Stát ná aon cheann dá bhaill ó Airteagal 25 4 4 a chomhlíonadh gur leagadh an dualgas seo ar an gcléireach trí ghnáthrialacha a cinneadh sa Teach Tá impléadáil á déanamh ar an Stát féin faoina ainm bunreachtúil Éire sa chaingean seo agus ní dhearnadh aon agóid ina choinne sin Is gnó don Dáil amháin ar ndóigh iad gnáthrialacha na Dála a cinneadh de réir Airteagal 15 10 den Bhunreacht agus ní dhearnadh aon iarracht sna himeachtaí seo iad a chur i bhfeidhm sna Cúirteanna Ní ghlacaim go bhfuil sé mar éifeacht ag dualgas a leagan ar oifigeach de chuid an Tí trí ghnáthrialacha na Dála dualgas nach leagann an Bunreacht air go gceadaíonn sé don Stát féin gan oibleagáid follasach a chomhlíonadh Tá cumhachtaí agus díolúinte imleora ag an Dáil agus ag a baill agus tá siad i dteideal iad a bheith acu chun a bhfeidhmeanna atá lárnach don chineál Rialtais a éilíonn an Bunreacht a chomhlíonadh Ach ní fheictear domsa gur féidir le rialacha agus gnáthrialacha ceachtar de na Tithe cealú a dhéanamh ar dhliteanas an Stáit i bpróis dhlíthiúil a d agair saoránach ar ar bhronn imeachtaí locus standi chun gearán a dhéanamh faoi shárú oibleagáide bunreachtúla Dá gcreidfí a mhalairt b ionann é agus a chreidiúint gur choisc an Bunreacht féin leigheas ar shárú a théarmaí féin NEAMART OIFIGIÚIL ÉIFEACHTACH Is cosúil go gcruthaíonn an cás seo nuair a mheastar é in éineacht leis na cásanna eile a luadh go bhfuiltear tagtha chuig staid anois atá ag teacht chun cinn le fiche bliain nó mar sin nach soláthraítear ábhar tábhachtach dlíthiúil i nGaeilge ach go fánach agus gur minic sin mar fhreagairt ar dhlíthíocht nó ar bhagairtí dlíthíochta Is amhlaidh an scéal ní amháin maidir le hábhar le haghaidh úsáide i gcúrsaí cointinneacha ar nós ionchúisimh choiriúil ach i gcás foirmeacha reachtúla a úsáidtear go coitianta mar iad siúd a thagann faoi Acht na gCuideachtaí Deir Tuarascáil Fasach 1986 bhí sé geall le bheith do dhéanta teacht ar bhundoiciméid fiú a chuirfeadh beartaíocht shimplí thráchtála i gcrích sa chéad teanga oifigiúil Deir sé freisin Tá a bheag nó a mhór de neamhaird déanta ag Rialtais i ndiaidh a chéile den Ghaeilge mar bheotheanga in úsáid oifigiúil agus laethúil i gcúrsaí Dlí agus sa chóras riaracháin a bhaineann leis an Dlí má fhágaimid i leataoibh aon tagairt do sheasamh gradamach na teanga Mar chruthú ar seo is é an Béarla amháin geall leis atá in úsáid ag an Stát i gcúrsaí uile a bhaineann le nós imeachta Cúirte gnóthaí a bhaineann le talamh agus maoin agus gnáthfheidhmiú Ranna agus Gníomhaireachtaí Stáit Caithfidh mé a rá gur cosúil go gcruthaíonn stair an cháis atá á chaibidil faoi láthair fírinne na gcáintí seo Creidim go bhfuil sé ceart a rá chomh maith Tá sé ag éirí níos coitianta de réir a chéile go mbeadh seirbhís chúngaithe á tairiscint do chainteoirí Gaeilge ar iarratas amháin agus faoi réir í a bheith caothúil don chóras seachas ina cheart ab initio Ba dheacair a mhaíomh go bhfuil an méid seo ag teacht le Airteagal 8 den Bhunreacht Is é mo dhearcadhsa go bhfuiltear tagtha chuig staid anois nach ndéanfadh ach duine a mbeadh neamhspleáchas agus dianseasmhacht thar an ngnáth ag baint leis nó léi iarracht ar ghnó dlíthiúil a dhéanamh trí Ghaeilge Má lorgaíonn a leithéid de dhuine Reacht i nGaeilge ó shiopa oifigiúil an Rialtais is é is dóichí ná go ndéarfar leis nach bhfuil sé ar fáil Níl aon leagan Gaeilge ann de na foirmeacha atá riachtanach chun éileamh simplí a thionscnamh sa Chúirt Dúiche ná de na foirmeacha a chuirfeadh ar chumas duine mar shampla finné a thoghairm nó achomharc a thosú Léiríonn an taithí phraiticiúil sna cásanna a luadh sa bhreithiúnas seo gur rímhinic is gá dlíthíocht nó bagairt dlithíochta chun go gcuirfear na doiciméid seo ar fáil Agus cúrsaí mar atá cúrsaí nach bhfuil aon fhonn oifigiúil ann iad a athrú déantar daoine a mhímhisniú nó a chosc ó ghnó dlíthiúil a dhéanamh trí mheán na teanga náisiúnta Ní aon ionadh é faoi na cúinsí sin nach bhfuil mórán dul chun cinn déanta ag an nGaeilge ná ag cainteoirí Gaeilge maidir le gnáthúsáid na teanga náisiúnta sna cúirteanna Is fior go bhfuil eisceachtaí breátha ann ón bpolasaí neamairt de facto seo ar nós staidéir scolártha chríochnúil ar théacs Gaeilge Bhunreacht na hÉireann a cuireadh ar fáil anuraidh faoi choimirce Choiste Uile Pháirti an Oireachtais ar an mBunreacht Tá dea shampla tugtha os comhair an tsaoil freisin ag dlíodóirí mar iad siúd ar dhá thaobh an cháis faoi láthair agus ag breithiúna an Breitheamh Ó hAnluain iarbhreitheamh de chuid na hArd Chúirte go suntasach ina measc a léirigh gur féidir argóint chasta chaolchúiseach agus breitheanna suaitheanta a dhéanamh go foirfe sa teanga náisiúnta Ní mór fáiltiú freisin roimh fhoilseachán de chuid Chomhairle Chorpraithe na dTuairiscí Dlí d Éirinn is é sin imleabhar speisialta de Thuairiscí Éireann a chuimsíonn cásanna a éisteadh agus a cinneadh i nGaeilge idir 1980 agus 1998 Ach is eisceachtaí iad seo ar toradh iad ar inspreagadh agus ar obair dhaoine ar leith atá tiomnaithe don ghnó sin Ní féidir leo athrú ar bith a chur ar an bhfirinne lom go n aireoidh an té a lorgaíonn bunábhar dlíthiúil i nGaeilge go bhfúil sé ag goilleadh ar na hoifigigh óna lorgaíonn sé iad agus is cinnte go n aireoidh sé go ndéileáilfi níos gasta agus níos éifeachtúla lena ghnó

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  • go bhfuil a leithéid de cheart ann agus go bhfuil a réim mar atá leagtha amach ag an mBreitheamh Ó hAnluain D ainneoin nach bhfuil sé riachtanach é a shocrú sa chás seo b feidir nach bhfuil an ceart cás a reachtáil tré Gaeilge dearfach go hiomlán agus go bhféadfadh tosca bheith ann nuair a mheadh cead ag cúirt nó binse fiosrúcháin a rá go gcaithfi an cás a reachtáil i mBéarla Tharlódh sé seo mar shampla dá mbeadh deacrachtaí do leigheasta ann chun teangaire a fháil taobh istigh de thréimhse réasúnta Má tá an ceart agam i mo dhearcadh maidir le réim an chirt chun cás a reachtáil i nGaeilge téann sé le reasún i gcúisiú mar seo go bhfuil ceart ag an Stát cúisiú a dhéanamh i mBéarla d ainneoin go dteastaíonn ón gcosantóir a chosaint nó a cosaint a dhéanamh i nGaeilge Anuas ar sin fiú más amhlaidh go ndéanann Stiurthóir na nImchúiseamh Poiblí nó údaras imchúisithe eile sa cás céanna mar chomhartha deá mhéine nó ar fáthanna eile socrú chun an cúisiú a bheith i nGaeilge ní gá go mbeadh cáipéis ar a bhfuil an cúisitheoir ag brath air i nGaeilge Maidir le cáipéis tá mé ag cur san aireamh aon rud atá á chur isteach mar fhianaise agus a nglactar leis de ghnáth mar dhoiciméad agus chomh maith leis sin aon ionstraim reachtáil Rialacha na Cúirte san áireamh a bhfuiltear ag brath orthu Maidir leis seo níl mé ag cur na reachta san aireamh mar tá soláthar reachtúil ar leith dóibh siúd agus tiocfaidh mé ar ais chuige níos déanaí i mo bhreithiúnas Agus mé ag cur an tuairim seo i láthair braithim go mb fhéidir go bhfuil mé ag trasnaíl ar na tuairimí a nocht an Breitheamh Ó hAnluain san Ard Cúirt 13 Iúil 1990 i Delap v An tAire Dlí agus Cirt breithiúnas neamh fhoilsithe go dtí le déanaí ach atá anois foilsithe sna Tuariscí Speisialta 1980 1998 1ch 116 Sa chás sin bhí t iarratasóir ina aturnae i mBaile Átha Cliath ag saothrú gnó an dlíodóra i nGaeilge ar son a chliaint agus rinne sé iarratas ar dhearbhú agus ar ordú mandamus chun iallach a chur ar an Stát aistriúchán Gaeilge a sholáthar de Rialacha na gCúirteanna Uachtaracha Dúirt sé gur chruthaigh uireaspa na rialacha i nGaeilge constaic mhór dó fhéin agus dá chliant B é cinneadh an Bhreithímh Uí Anluain go raibh sé i dteideal an dearbhú a fháil ach cuireadh siar an t ordú mandamus de bharr go ndúradh sa Cúirt go raibh aistriúchán de na rialacha á ullmhú D admaigh an Breitheamh Ó hAnluain go raibh air glacadh le míniú ar Airteagal 8 3 den Bhunreacht mar a leagadh síos é sa Chúirt Uachtarach in an tArd Aighne v Coyne agus Wallace luaite thuas ach do lean an Breitheamh léannta ar aghaidh á rá nach raibh sé riachtanach don iarratasóir cabhair a fhái1 ó Airteagal 8 Ghlac sé leis go raibh cumhacht ag an gCoiste um Chruthú Rialacha i gcomhair leis an Aire Dlí agus Cirt chun na rialacha a dhéanamh i mBéarla amháin agus nach raibh aon sarú ar Airteagal 8 toisc go raibh na rialacha déanta i gceann amháin de na teangacha oifigiúla agus gan iad a bheith déanta sa teanga oifigiúil eile Do ghlac sé leis chomh maith gur bhain Airteagal 25 m 4 fo alt 4 den Bhunreacht le hAchtanna amháin agus ní do na hionstraimí reachtúla Ach do ghlac sé leis áfach go raibh an dearbhú tuillte don t iarratasóir ar na cúiseanna seo leanas Tá an ceart bunreachtúil ag gach saoránach teacht ós comhair na gcúirteanna a cuireadh ar bun de réir an Bhunreachta ionas gur féidir leo a gcearta a éileamh nó a chosaint faoín Bhunreacht agus nuair is mian le saoranach é seo a dhéanamh tá air de réir an dlí rialacha na gcúirteanna uachtaracha a chomhlíonadh in gach rud a bhaineann le himeachtaí san Ard Chúirt agus sa Chúirt Uachtarach Caithfidh sé úsáid a bhaint as na foirmeacha atá le fáil sna h aguisiní in éineacht leis na rialacha nó na foirmeacha a hathraíodh de réir tosca éagsúla ionas go gcomhlíonaidís na rialacha ó thús na n imeachtaí go dtí an deireadh Tá ceart aige faoín Bhunreacht a thaobh de na himeachtaí a reachtáil go hiomlán i nGaeilge más mian leis úsáid a bhaint as an gcéad teanga oifigiúil Tá mé den tuairim go bhfuil constaic mhór ina bhealach má theastaíonn uaidh an Ghaeilge a úsáid ach muna bhfuil ag an am gcéanna aon leagan oifigiúil ar fáil den dlí sna rialacha maidir le riaradh a leithéid d imeachtaí nó de na foirmeacha a ghabhann leo agus nach bhfuil sé ag fáil cothrom na féine sa cás sin i gcomparáid leis an chuid sin den pobal atá go hiomlán sásta an leagan Béarla a úsáid i gcónaí Tá mé ag glacadh leis mar ceapaimse go bhfuil an ceart agam go bhfuil an t iarratasóir mar chosantóir i gcúisiú Baile Átha Cliathach in ann Béarla a labhairt agus a thuiscint agus mar sin chomh fada is atá sé ag iarraidh rialacha agus foirmeacha i nGaeilge níl sé ag argóint ar bhonn na cothromaíochta nadúrtha Ní raibh breithiúnas Uí Anluain bunaithe ar ndoigh ar an gcothromaíocht nadúrtha ach ar an gcothromaíocht simpliciter Tá faitíos orm má tá baint féin aige leis an gcás seo rud a bhfuil mé in amhras faoí nach féidir liom aontú leis A luaithe is a ghlactar le míniú an Bhreithimh Kingsmill Moore ar Alt 3 de Airteagal 8 ansin cés moite de chúrsaí cothromaíochta nadúrtha ní féidir aon dualgas a bheith ar an Stát chun a chinntiú go mbeidh na ionstraimí reachtúla maraon lena gcuid foirmeacha ar fáil ins an dá theanga oifigiúil is cuma an bhfuil siad ag teastáil ó aon duine páirteach sna himeachtaí nó nach bhfuil Creidim go bhfuil an argóint faoin gcothromaíocht do ghlactha Má tá an fhoirm chuí atá le líonadh ag dlíthí agus má tá sonraí na foirme scríofa i gceann

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  • operators of the development Eurogroup and was involved in the negotiations of the contract with those operators The Respondent had numerous meetings and communications with the selling agents and was involved in the organisation of marketing campaigns including accompanying selling agents on site visits The Respondent was responsible for introducing the eventual funder of the contract and had numerous meetings with that funder Neil McCann 6 The Appellant s defence was delivered on 28th May 2010 It traversed all matters pleaded by the Respondent In particular it was denied that a the Appellant agreed that the Respondent would render services whether alleged or at all b the Appellant agreed to pay to the Respondent the sum alleged or any sum whether in respect of services as alleged or at all and c that the alleged sum or any sum was due and owing by the Appellant to the Respondent It was specifically pleaded that the Appellant was under no obligation legal or moral to make payment of the sum of 200 000 or any other payment to the Respondent 7 The delivery of the defence marked the end of the pleadings No reply was delivered on behalf of the Respondent The hearing 8 The hearing took place over two days on 5th and 6th April 2011 On the appeal counsel for the Appellant attached particular emphasis to the fact that when opening the case counsel for the Respondent identified the issue for the Court as a very net issue that is to say as to whether or not the Appellant owed the sum of 200 000 claimed by the Respondent Emphasis was attached to the fact that in opening counsel for the Respondent while outlining a joint venture agreement entered into by the parties in early 2006 under which the Respondent was to invest 750 000 in the French project which had fallen away specifically identified the agreement in respect of which the Respondent was then suing as an agreement under which the Respondent was to be paid 200 000 on completion of the development for services rendered The first day of the hearing was taken up with the opening and the evidence of the Respondent 9 At the commencement of the hearing on the second day the trial judge raised with the parties whether in the event that he was unable to be satisfied as to the definite terms of any agreement between the parties the parties were agreed that the matter could be progressed on a quantum meruit basis in which event the Court would have to decide what sum might be appropriate The unequivocal response of counsel for the Appellant was that he was not agreeing that the matter could be dealt with on a quantum meruit basis giving as a reason the way in which the matter had been pleaded and in essence that the Court was not in a position to deal with a quantum meruit based claim After a short recess the cross examination of the Respondent continued In the course of the cross examination the trial judge intervened as counsel for the Appellant emphasised pointing to the fact that the net issue upon which counsel for the Appellant insisted whether there was agreement reached between the parties was the only issue in the case the crucial issue being whether there was a discussion between the parties at which a buyout figure a valuation for services rendered up to that time was discussed and agreed and if so what was decided In the course of the intervention the trial judge stated that if counsel for the Appellant was indicating that he should not deal with the case on a quantum meruit basis then the trial judge simply would have to decide it on an all or nothing basis 10 After the intervention the cross examination of the Respondent was completed Two witnesses apart from the Respondent were called on behalf of the Respondent Mr Tony Forte and Mr Neil McCann both of whom were referred to in the reply to para 1 of the notice of particulars quoted above Following the completion of the case of the Respondent the Appellant then testified One other witness an external accountant and auditor in this jurisdiction for the Appellant s group of companies gave evidence on behalf of the Appellant 11 Thereafter the trial judge indicated that he was going to give his decision He indicated that the longer he had been listening to the case the more sympathy he had with both sides in the matter Indeed the evidence adduced in relation to the collapse of the property market in 2008 is conducive of sympathy for the parties Findings and decision of the trial judge 12 In his ex tempore judgment having outlined the evidence as to the relationship between the Respondent and the Appellant in relation to the development in France from its inception the trial judge focused on the position from late November 2006 and the alleged agreement pleaded and relied upon on behalf of the Respondent outlining the evidence as to the interaction between the parties in late November 2006 by e mail and otherwise He set out his conclusion as follows I am quite satisfied that this sum of 200 000 00 was mentioned by the Respondent because the Appellant accepts himself that it was mentioned But insofar as reaching a conclusion on the balance of probabilities that a concluded agreement was reached that that sum would be paid I am not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that any such agreement was made I think that what the Appellant has said to me strikes me as more probable that he would consider this alternative proposal of 200 000 00 even though he did not revert and nothing further was heard from the Appellant I am driven to that conclusion by the emails the contents of those emails that there was a buy off figure that the Appellant recognised that there would have to be some sort of settlement or deal But if a figure was mentioned and if he did not respond with a simply worded email I am of the view that the Appellant nonetheless recognised that he had to pay the Respondent something But I am not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that there was a concluded agreement that the sum should be 200 000 00 As has been outlined earlier there has been no cross appeal against that finding 13 The trial judge then referred to the Respondent s claim for such further and other relief as to the Court should seem meet and indicated that he proposed to consider and apply it notwithstanding the protest by counsel for the Appellant The trial judge made it clear that he considered that there was nothing that had not been dealt with fully and comprehensively in the evidence He rejected the contention that the Appellant could not deal with the case or could not deal with the evidence that had been given or that the Court had not been given enough information from which he could make a fair assessment of the value of the services rendered by the Respondent 14 In relation to that claim for relief the trial judge went on to state that he was going to reach his own conclusion as to the value of the Respondent s services He continued I do believe while they were not as significant or as far reaching as he himself believes they were nonetheless of considerable value to the Appellant particularly in the early stages I propose to assess the value of those services at 75 000 and give a decree for that sum together with costs Earlier the trial judge had outlined the Respondent s view of his contribution to the Appellant as follows The Respondent on the other hand took the view I have added great value to this project I have introduced Neil McCann to it I have also introduced DNG and I have introduced Tony Forte I have made a significant ongoing contribution No evidence whatsoever independent expert or otherwise had been adduced at the hearing as to the scope of the benefit which had flowed to the Appellant from and was attributable to the services which had been provided by the Respondent to the Appellant or to put a monetary value on that benefit The appeal 15 As has been noted earlier on the appeal the Appellant seeks to have so much of the judgment of the High Court as made an award of damages on a quantum meruit basis discharged The grounds on which it is alleged that the trial judge erred in law and in fact or on mixed questions of law and fact in reaching that conclusion are set out comprehensively in the Appellant s notice of appeal Those grounds on the basis of the submissions made on behalf of the Appellant may be subsumed into the following arguments a that a claim by the Respondent based on the principle of quantum meruit formed no part of the Respondent s claim as pleaded as particularised or as opened to the High Court on the hearing b that there was no evidence of the value attributable to the services the Respondent contended that he provided to the Appellant before the High Court there being no witnesses on that matter and no opportunity to cross examine c that there was no evidence of the benefit which was alleged to have accrued to the Appellant from those services before the High Court and in particular no evidence that such benefit accrued to the Appellant personally as distinct from the Appellant s group of companies and d that the issue of granting relief on a quantum meruit basis was raised by the trial judge and neither party invited him to determine the claim on that basis What flows from those submissions is that it is contended that in the course of the hearing in the High Court the Appellant and his counsel were taken by surprise there being two elements which gave rise to that situation that the pleadings did not contain a claim for an award on a quantum meruit basis and that the facts which might have underpinned a claim for an award on a quantum meruit basis and its quantification were neither pleaded nor part of the case in consequence of which no evidence was adduced in relation to those facts Pleading point 16 The starting point for the Appellant in outlining the legal position in relation to pleading was to quote the oft quoted passage from the judgment of Fitzgerald J in Mahon v Celbridge Spinning Co Ltd 1967 I R 1 which as stated by Keane J in McGee v O Reilly 1996 2 I R 229 conveniently and compendiously states the purpose of a pleading Fitzgerald J stated at p 3 The whole purpose of a pleading be it a statement of claim defence or reply is to define the issues between the parties to confine the evidence at the trial to the matters relevant to those issues and to ensure that the trial may proceed to judgment without either party being taken at a disadvantage by the introduction of matters not fairly to be ascertained from the pleadings In other words a party should know in advance in broad outline the case he will have to meet at the trial Of course the consequence of the importance of pleadings in defining the issues between the parties as pointed out in Delany and McGrath on Civil Procedure in the Superior Courts 3rd Ed at para 5 32 is that a party will not be permitted to make a case that is materially different to its pleaded case unless leave to make an appropriate amendment in the pleadings of that party is obtained No opportunity was sought by the Respondent in this case to amend his pleadings to include a claim for damages based on quantum meruit or unjust enrichment Delany and McGrath cite the decision of the High Court Clarke J in Moorview Developments v First Active Plc 2008 IEHC 211 in support of that proposition Clarke J emphasised that when opening a case the plaintiff is confined to his or her pleaded case While counsel for the Respondent in their written submissions recognised that as being the law it was submitted that on any fair analysis of the case as pleaded and on the evidence the trial judge was entitled to assess the value of the work done and the services rendered by the Respondent on the basis that he did The reality in my view is that there was no objective evidence before the High Court by reference to which the trial judge was in a position to assess the value of the work done or the services rendered by the Respondent for the benefit of the Appellant 17 However in their submissions counsel for the Respondent went further It was submitted that the trial judge was entitled to determine the issue on a quantum meruit basis and to make the award he made notwithstanding that the Respondent had not pleaded or advanced in any way a claim based on quantum meruit In support of that contention counsel for the Respondent relied on a recent decision of this Court Duffy v Ridley Properties Limited 2008 4 I R 282 I consider that reliance on that decision is misconceived 18 In the commentary on the necessary contents of a statement of claim in Delany and McGrath op cit it is stated at para 5 42 that the statement of claim must contain a prayer for relief at the end setting out clearly the relief sought in summary form similar to that used in an endorsement of claim in a plenary summons However the authors point out that there are some reliefs that can be granted even if not specifically claimed As regards the relevant examples given it is stated that it is not necessary to specifically claim the relief of damages in addition to or in lieu of specific performance an inquiry in damages citing the decision in Duffy v Ridley Properties Limited The rationale for that aspect of the decision in Duffy v Ridley Properties Limited is to be found in the judgment of Finnegan J with whom the other judges of the Supreme Court concurred at para 62 There Finnegan J stated It is customary in the indorsement of claim and statement of claim in an action for specific performance as here to claim damages in addition to or in lieu of specific performance but also to claim as a relief if necessary an inquiry as to title and an inquiry as to damages It is not necessary to do so Special damages should be claimed and particularised in the statement of claim Prior to the Chancery Amendment Act 1858 the Court of Chancery in refusing to grant specific performance of a concluded agreement did so without prejudice to the right of the plaintiff to bring an action at common law for damages After the Act of 1858 the Court of Chancery and after the Judicature Act the High Court in refusing specific performance will proceed to consider the question of damages even where such question is not raised by the pleadings see Daniell s Chancery Practice 10th ed p 1134 and cases there cited In recent times at least the common practice for the court in refusing to award specific performance is to direct an inquiry as to damages see In re Greendale Developments Ltd No 3 2000 2 I R 514 That passage demonstrates that the exception to the general rule which arises where there is no express claim for damages in addition to or in lieu of specific performance has a clear statutory basis Further the practice of directing an inquiry as to damages ensures that the party seeking specific performance has an opportunity to address the issue of the quantum of damages on the hearing of the inquiry Nothing similar applies on or arises in this case 19 Indeed the Respondent s reliance on the decision in Duffy v Ridley Properties Limited and in particular the passage from the judgement of Finnegan J which was cited highlights an evidential deficiency in this case which clearly did not arise in Duffy v Ridley Properties Limited Finnegan J stated at p 75 I am satisfied that the trial judge was entitled to adopt the approach which she did She dealt with the matter on the basis of the evidence which the parties chose to adduce She rationalised clearly the basis upon which she assessed the evidence of the valuers each of whom gave oral evidence and were cross examined This court should not interfere with her finding In contrast as has already been noted there was no evidence adduced in this case of the value of the work done and the services rendered by the Respondent or the benefit which accrued to the Appellant on the basis of which the Respondent could be properly remunerated on a quantum meruit basis by the Appellant 20 The position adopted on behalf of the Appellant on the appeal was that it would be out of place to enter into a detailed exposition of the law relating to a quantum meruit claim when no such analysis took place in the court below On the other hand the line adopted on behalf of the Respondent was that the Respondent rendered services to the Appellant from which the Appellant had the commercial benefit and for which he continued to deny the Respondent recompense so that as I understand the argument the Appellant was thereby unjustly enriched Counsel for the Respondent then referred to the decision of this Court in Corporation of Dublin v Building and Allied Trade Union 1996 1 I R 468 as authority for the pre conditions

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  • the terminal Insofar as it may be necessary to consider the meaning of that phrase in the course of this judgment any such consideration will be guided by the principles enunciated by McCarthy J in In re XJS Investments Limited Some observations I have already adverted to the fact that a large scale development will inevitably attract opposition Some developments will attract more opposition than others Those which carry an element of risk involve hazardous operations or in some other way have a major impact on a particular locality will inevitably attract most opposition The project at issue in this case involved the construction of a gas terminal In the circumstances it is hardly surprising that the development was accompanied by a great deal of opposition including demonstrations at the sites apart altogether from legal objections of the kind involved in these proceedings It is understandable that Mr Sweetman a person who has an avowed interest in the environment and in areas of special amenity rich in wildlife and plant life would be concerned at the implications for the environment in the development of such a large infrastructure project When proceedings such as this are commenced no doubt prompted by concerns for the environment it is important that such proceedings are properly formulated I have already summarised the type of reliefs sought by Mr Sweetman in the originating notice of motion and I should also refer to an observation of Smyth J in regard to the proceedings commenced by Mr Sweetman He stated at page 19 of his judgment 2007 3 IR 13 as follows The applicant s affidavit and that of his adviser Mr Bergin grounding the application allege assert or suggest widespread non compliance by Shell with a number of conditions of the planning permission and further that Shell has engaged in unauthorised development The order of Quirke J of the 16th March 2005 permitted inspection of the terminal site to ascertain whether unauthorised works were being carried out thereon Notwithstanding this facility and the applicant s liberty to file any replying affidavit s to those filed on behalf of Shell so as to put before the court any real firm evidence of non compliance or the carrying out of any alleged unauthorised development no such affidavit evidence has been put before the court This is a notable feature of this case as the affidavits filed on behalf of Shell identify many inaccuracies in the applicant s assertions Smyth J also noted that a number of the reliefs sought namely those sought under the Local Government Water Pollution Acts 1977 to 1990 and the Waste Management Acts 1996 to 2003 were conceded by Mr Sweetman not to have been properly sought in these proceedings Thus Smyth J was critical of the wide ranging allegations that were made by Mr Sweetman as to unauthorised development in circumstances where there were many inaccuracies in the applicant s assertions It goes without saying that a person invoking the jurisdiction of the courts in proceedings of this kind has a responsibility in relation to the assertions being made in the proceedings Assertions have to be supported by evidence Equally such a person has a responsibility to ensure that the proceedings are managed appropriately and speedily Delay in the conduct of the proceedings may cause hardship to the party entitled to develop a particular project and in cases of excessive delay the delay may disentitle the applicant to the relief sought in the proceedings In the context of this case the learned trial judge observed at page 37 of the judgment as follows Where an injunction under the Planning Acts would cause gross or disproportionate hardship to a respondent relief may be withheld In Avenue Properties Ltd v Farrell Homes Ltd as earlier cited 21 Barrington J declined to grant an order because it would have been unduly harsh and burdensome to grant an injunction notwithstanding the fact that the respondents are formally in the wrong Likewise the potential hardship to the respondent has also been recognised as a relevant factor in the exercise of the court s discretion Dublin County Council v Sellwood Quarries Ltd 1981ILRM 23 O Connell v Dungarvan Energy Ltd unrep Hg Ct Finnegan J 7th February 2001 Grimes v Punchestown Develop Co 2002 ILRM 409 and Leen v Aer Rianta Plc 2003 4 IR 394 Evidence establishes that Shell has expended very considerable monies in circumstances where it bona fide believed that the planning authority agreed that it had complied with the conditions of the planning permission Even if I were wrong in my determination of fact and law as to conditions 1 and 37 I would exercise my discretion in refusing to grant the relief sought by reason of the hardship to Shell especially having regard to the delay on the part of the applicant which has had the effect of very significantly increasing the financial loss that would be suffered if an order under s 160 had the effect of delaying the completion of the development were now made It is relevant to refer to that passage from the judgment of the learned trial judge because of the reference to delay on the part of Mr Sweetman in the conduct of the proceedings before the High Court Following the decision of the learned trial judge set out in his judgment and perfected in the order of the High Court on the 28th March 2006 a notice of appeal was lodged by Mr Sweetman on the 30th April 2006 The appeal then lay dormant until 2014 when it appeared in a list of uncertified cases on the direction of the Chief Justice It is entirely inappropriate that any appeal should be left in abeyance for upwards of eight years but given the nature of the appeal in this case such delay is all the more inappropriate It must be borne in mind that the relief sought in the notice of appeal was firstly a declaration that Condition 37 has not been complied with and secondly and more pertinently an order that in the event of full and prompt compliance with Condition 37 not being effected any further works on the development be restrained It could not seriously be expected by Mr Sweetman that having sat back for eight years and allowed Shell to complete a multimillion Euro development of the kind involved in this case should then come to court to pursue an appeal in which part of the relief sought is to restrain any further works on the development It is simply not acceptable to conduct litigation of this kind in that way From Mr Sweetman s point of view if a court was to find in his favour on the legal issues he would face great difficulty in persuading a court to grant him any relief having regard to the change of circumstances since the matter was first decided in the High Court From the point of view of Shell one can only begin to imagine the implications from a financial point of view if a court were minded to allow the appeal and to grant the relief sought by Mr Sweetman That is to say nothing whatsoever of the impact such an order could have on employment and the local economy in the area where the gas terminal is now situated In fairness to Mr Sweetman it was urged on this Court that when the matter was before the High Court it was never Mr Sweetman s case that the orders sought should be made there and then namely to stop all works Rather it was suggested that the Court was being invited to make a determination that Shell were in breach of Condition No 37 and to afford Shell an opportunity to comply with Condition No 37 In practical terms that is the approach urged on the Court at the hearing of the appeal Given that Mr Sweetman was effectively seeking injunctive relief it was always going to be the case that an important factor in deciding whether or not to grant such relief would be the exercise of discretion by the trial judge Smyth J in the passage above referred to the fact that Shell had by the time the matter came before him expended very considerable sums of money and that the delay on the part of Mr Sweetman in prosecuting the proceedings before the High Court had the effect of very significantly increasing the financial loss that would be suffered if an order under s 160 had the effect of delaying the completion of the development At that time the development of the site was in the early stages However since the appeal was lodged Shell proceeded with and has now completed the development and the first gas from the Corrib field has now been brought on shore Thus the position on the ground has changed considerably since the proceedings were before the High Court The fact that the development has been completed in the meantime may explain why Mr Sweetman has said that he is now inviting the Court to make a determination that Condition 37 has not been complied with and to allow Shell an opportunity to comply with Condition 37 rather than seeking an order that the terminal be shut down In truth the fact that it was necessary to force the appeal on for hearing through a listing in the uncertified appeals list might be an indication that Mr Sweetman has lost his enthusiasm for the case made before the High Court Condition 37 Condition 37 was designed to ensure that upon the cessation of activity at the terminal there would be in place a fund to provide for the satisfactory reinstatement of the site It provided that this could be achieved by means of a cash deposit a bond of an insurance company or other security There was to be an agreement empowering Mayo County Council to apply such security to the satisfactory reinstatement of the site Significantly Condition 37 provided that the form and amount of the security shall be as agreed between Mayo County Council and the developer Prior to the commencement of the development there had been an exchange of correspondence between Shell and Mayo County Council In a letter of 10th December 2004 Shell wrote to the County Council in the following terms We confirm that we intend to put in place the following arrangements in order to secure the satisfactory reinstatement of the gas terminal site 1 The provision of a parent company guarantee from the parent company of Shell E P Ireland Limited SEPIL Shell Overseas Holdings Limited SOHL SOH or its successors and assigns to secure the satisfactory reinstatement of the gas terminal site on cessation of activity at the terminal The final guarantee will require formal board approval in due course SOH is a company registered in England and Wales and has substantial assets As of the date of its last audited accounts namely for the calendar year 2002 SOH reported total assets less current liabilities of 17 625 4m SOH would provide the Council with a copy of its audited accounts on an annual basis SOH would also provide the Council with an independent credit assessment report in respect of SOH The guarantee would be for a sum equal to 20m the current estimated cost of reinstating the gas terminal This sum would be escalated throughout the life of the guarantee in accordance with the relevant Consumer Price Index Building Cost Index The guarantee would be put in place for a period so as to cover the time when decommissioning of the gas terminal site will occur There shall be five yearly reviews of these arrangements by both parties to assess the adequacy of the financial provisions and 2 an agreement empowering the Council to apply the parent company guarantee or part of it to the satisfactory reinstatement of the gas terminal site The guarantee would be able to be activated by the Council in the event of SEPIL failing to reinstate the site to the satisfaction of the Council following cessation of operations Any disagreement between the Council and SEPIL in this regard would be referred to the determination of An Bord Pleanála or any successor of the Board We undertake that we shall promptly progress the putting in place of the arrangements referred to above in consultation with and to the satisfaction of the Council within six months from the date of this letter If at the expiry of a five month period the agreement is not in place SEPIL must enter into discussions with the Council and the Council may extend the period at its discretion or alternatively take whatever action the Council deems appropriate By letter dated the 10th December 2004 Mayo County Council wrote to Shell and in connection with Condition 37 stated as follows Mayo County Council agrees to the terms set out in your letter of undertaking submitted Friday 10th December 2004 as security to secure the satisfactory reinstatement of the site following cessation of activity at the terminal Smyth J in the course of his judgment 2007 3 IR 13 observed that the completion of the security arrangement had been overtaken by events namely the institution of seperate judicial review proceedings by Mr Sweetman and by a Mr Harrington and that the completion of the matters referred to in the correspondence on the 10th December 2004 was put on hold as a result of those proceedings He observed in the course of his judgment at page 29 What is required by the condition is that an agreement i s made between Shell and Mayo County Council prior to development for the purpose of ensuring the restoration of the site when activity ceases The form and amount of the security to be given is to be determined by the Planning Authority There is no obligation requiring delivery of any specific amount by Shell or any other person Neither is a form of the documentation laid down in the condition He continued at page 30 When the condition left the form and amount of the security to be agreed this was the prerogative not of Shell but by of the Planning Authority The importance of the agreement of the Planning Authority is crucial clearly an acceptance of a derisory sum by way of security would not be within the context of so large and complex a development viewed by a court as genuine and proper compliance However an element of judgment is left with the Planning Authority with a default mechanism if the amount tendered by Shell is inadequate or the amount sought by the Planning Authority was excessive or an uncommitted letter were tendered Likewise the planning authority must agree to the form of security offered whether it be in the form of a letter of comfort or other form is a matter within their judgment He noted that objection was taken to the form of the document i e the letter of the 10th December 2004 as not being a security and that what was being tendered was a promise that Shell s parent company would provide a guarantee Smyth J stated In my judgment this is a case in which if matters had progressed as envisaged in December 2004 all the necessary form of documentation as a matter of probability would have been duly executed As he observed judicial review proceedings were commenced in December 2004 and subsequently in March 2005 the instant proceedings were commenced by Mr Sweetman He then concluded at p 32 I find as a fact and as a matter of law that there has been substantial compliance with Condition 37 Undoubtedly there remains outstanding as agreed by Mr Maurice Collins SC appearing for Shell certain formalities to be fulfilled In the course of the submissions no authority was advanced to the Court substantiating the right of a third party to challenge an agreement actually made between a planning authority and a developer and to invoke the discretion of the Court to set aside such agreement Thus as can be seen Smyth J s conclusion was that there had been substantial compliance with the terms of Condition 37 notwithstanding that the formal arrangements had not been put in place between Shell and Mayo County Council Since that time the formal requirements to comply with the terms of the letter of the 10th December 2004 as agreed between Shell and Mayo County Council have been put in place as described in the affidavit of Ann Hamilton sworn herein on the 15th October 2015 The Corrib Gas Terminal Reinstatement Agreement together with a guarantee was entered into between Shell and Mayo County Council on the 16th August 2011 By letter dated the 22nd August 2011 Mayo County Council wrote to Shell s planning advisers and stated that the Council considers that the terms of Condition 37 of the decision of An Bord Pleanála Ref PL16 207212 have been complied with Mootness and Discretion For the purpose of considering whether it could be said that this appeal is now moot it would be helpful to recall the timeline involved in some of the events at the heart of these proceedings First of all planning permission for the development of the Corrib Gas Terminal was granted by An Bord Pleanála on the 22nd October 2004 On the 10th December 2004 agreement was reached between Shell and Mayo County Council on the form of security and the amount thereof It was intended that the formal arrangements to give effect to that agreement would be put in place later Two sets of judicial review proceedings were commenced one by the applicant Record No 1165JR 2004 and the other by Martin Harrington against Shell Others Record No 1164 2004JR the purpose of which was to quash the decision of An Bord Pleanála to grant permissions The other proceedings were subsequently

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  • Ombudsman and the three defendants for the Irish Farmers Association should be dismissed out of the action and having established that the orders made by Mr Justice Barron were the correct orders I will dismiss these appeals accordingly O Flaherty J and Egan J were recorded as agreeing It is then stated that counsel for the State said There is an appeal outstanding This is clearly a reference to the motion for judgment in default of defence McCarthy J replied I think effectively it would be better to let it stand It seems clear therefore that the Court did not make a final order disposing the appeal on the motion for judgment This is the genesis of the first issue which this Court has to deal with Observations on the Motion for Judgment 17 Looked at from this remove it seems at least possible to me that this was not an error or oversight on the part of the Court as Finnegan J later suggested but a well intentioned attempt if misguided and certainly unsuccessful as matters turned out to allow the proceedings to expire naturally without the further aggravation that could be caused by further hearings and orders for costs In the light of the court s determination of the special issue there was no possible answer to the application brought by the defendants to strike out the claims made against them The motion for the judgment was also redundant because the High Court and the Supreme Court had now determined the substance of the controversy between the plaintiffs and the defendant It is true that Mr Rooney might have argued that technically he had been entitled to bring the motion and therefore should recover costs even if there could be no question of entering judgment against the State defendants However Mr Rooney was representing himself and therefore at most could have recovered expenses and would not have been entitled to a professional fee if the matter had been pressed to its logical conclusion On the other hand it would then be difficult to argue that all matters should not be pressed to their logical conclusion and an order for costs made on the substantive appeal in favour of the Minister and the matter returned to the High Court for an application to enter judgment in favour of the State parties with consequential costs Certainly given the fact that Mr Rooney had been unsuccessful on the main appeal the overall cost outcome on 19th December 1991 was favourable to him 18 All of this is however necessarily speculative Nothing happened in relation to the uncompleted motion for a very long time Eventually in 2009 the matter came before the Supreme Court again and Finnegan J delivered judgment on the 9th of March 2010 Hardiman and Macken JJ concurring Having recorded his conclusion that the motion for judgment remained outstanding he continued There was clearly an oversight and no determination was made on the appellant s appeal in relation to the motion seeking judgment in default of defence By the date of the hearing of the motions before Mr Justice Barron the defences had indeed been delivered and the appellant s complaint is that they were not delivered within the time limited by the Rules of the Superior Courts Ordinarily in these circumstances the only issue on the hearing of the motion would be in relation to the costs of the motion The action proceeded thereafter to a full hearing on the special case which necessarily involved consideration of the defences delivered Notwithstanding this the appellant seeks to be allowed to wind back the clock and obtain judgment in default of defence It is in the interests of justice that this outstanding issue in these protracted proceedings be determined without further delay Once again this determination was favourable to the plaintiff Even though it seemed clear that no useful order could be obtained by the plaintiff at this point nevertheless if he was insisting on a hearing of his entitlement to claim judgment in default of defence then that should be permitted It is pursuant to this determination and order that the motion for judgment aspect of this matter comes before this Court for determination It is however regrettable that further delays occurred before it was heard That may have been due at least in part to the fact that other proceedings were being agitated at the same time The Next Steps in the Substantive Proceedings 1987 No 1120 Sp 19 In the immediate aftermath of the decision of the Supreme Court on the 19th of December 1991 the parties did not take any step to bring the matter back before the High Court to have any final order made in the proceedings It does seem clear that on the pleadings as they stood as of that point there was nothing of substance left to be determined While there was a claim for damages that claim was clearly contingent and consequential on the core issue which had already been extracted and determined by the decision of O Flaherty J for the Supreme Court on the 19th of December 1991 and whether Mr Rooney agreed with it or not that much certainly had been determined 20 Mr Rooney did not apply to have the motion for judgement appeal dealt with Instead he pursued a number of other issues It appears that Mr Rooney brought an application to the Supreme Court to have the two appeals 111 1990 the procedural appeals including the motion for judgment and the striking out rulings and 224 1991 the decision on the special case reheard by a court of five There could be no question of any such order being made and in due course the application was dismissed The plaintiff then sought to have an issue referred to the European Court of Justice It appears that on the 27th of July 1992 Costello J in the High Court refused this order Again the order is not in the papers supplied to this Court but the matter is referred to in a number of the chronologies submitted by Mr Rooney If Costello J did refuse to make a reference and I am prepared to accept that he did then he was entirely correct to do so as at that stage it could not be said that on the pleadings as they stood that any issue of European law was raised Thereafter in 1994 it appears that Morris P made no order on a motion brought by Mr Rooney for directions whether his action had been fully determined by the delivery of the judgment of the Supreme Court on the special case proceedings Again there is no record of this order among the papers but I am prepared to accept the reference in Mr Rooney s chronology for present purposes It is not clear what argument was made on this motion by either party but the fact that the application was brought by Mr Rooney does give some indication of Mr Rooney s thinking as of that point as to what if anything was left in the proceedings 1987 No 1120 Sp Court 6 Commencement of Rooney No 2 The 1995 Proceedings 21 There followed a reasonably lengthy period during which nothing occurred in relation to the 1987 proceedings In fact and unfortunately it appears that in 1994 a further issue arose in relation to Mr Rooney s herd When after testing it appeared that one animal may have been a reactor Mr Rooney refused to move the reactor in accordance with the regulations and insisted that he was entitled to compensation under the 1966 Act This as was subsequently pointed out was directly contrary to the outcome of the decision in Rooney No 1 Whatever arguments he might wish to make about the correctness or comprehensiveness of the 1987 proceedings it certainly had decided that he was not entitled to compensation under the 1966 Act That decision was final Nevertheless there followed a very distressing stand off when the health of the cattle was put at risk Eventually Mr Rooney commenced proceedings in 1995 against the State parties which has been referred to as Rooney No 2 That was a comprehensive challenge to the non statutory scheme and involved oral evidence and a ten day hearing but which only came to trial ten years later in 2004 I will return to the detail of those proceedings later at the appropriate point in this account 22 Six years after the incident with his herd which gave rise to the Rooney No 2 proceedings the plaintiff once again applied in July 2000 to the Supreme Court to set aside the order of the Supreme Court in the proceedings 111 1990 the three procedural motions and 224 1991 special case determination That was heard by the Supreme Court on a two day period on the 4th and 5th of July 2000 This was now the second time at least Mr Rooney had sought to set aside the determination of the Supreme Court on the 19th December 1991 On the 23rd of October 2000 the Supreme Court delivered a judgment rejecting the application The Motion to Amend the Statement of Claim is issued January 2001 An Isaac Wunder Order is made in Supreme Court 23 Having failed to have the decision of the Supreme Court set aside Mr Rooney brought a motion in January 2001 to amend the November 1989 Statement of Claim Jumping ahead somewhat for the purposes of identification this was the motion which was eventually heard in the High Court in 2010 and the appeal from the High Court decision is the second issue in the present application This was now ten years since the Supreme Court had delivered judgment on the special case However that motion was not proceeded with at the time Instead on the 12th March 2001 Mr Rooney brought an application to the Supreme Court seeking to have the decision of the Supreme Court on appeals 111 1991 and 224 1991 set aside on the grounds apparently that he contended that the Supreme Court had been in error in directing the trial of a special case on the plaintiff s action when the facts were disputed This was a challenge to the order of the 12th of October 1990 made by Griffin Hederman and O Flaherty JJ and was clearly yet a further and even more futile attempt to undermine the judgment of the Supreme Court on the special case issue The order of 12th October 1990 was clearly a final order Moreover it granted relief which Mr Rooney had sought and was acted on by him the other parties the High and Supreme Courts No purpose could be served by entertaining the application to seek to set aside an order directing the hearing of a special case which had been heard determined and appealed all more than a decade previously Moreover only the previous year the Supreme Court had refused to set aside the decision in the special case The Supreme Court in due course dismissed the application on the 5th of October 2001 and made an order restraining Mr Rooney from taking any further step in these proceedings other than in relation to the taxation of costs whether in the High Court or this Court except with the leave of this Court such leave to be sought by application in writing made to the registrar of this Court This is an order popularly known as an Isaac Wunder order The courts only make such orders with considerable reluctance The order in this case only related to the current proceedings and only restrained Mr Rooney from taking a further step in the proceedings without leave of the Court Thereafter perhaps as a result of this order things went quiet in the 1987 proceedings and Mr Rooney seems to have turned his attention and energies to the 1995 proceedings The High Court hears Rooney No 2 the 1995 proceedings 24 In 2004 Mr Rooney s claim in relation to the events of 1993 1996 came on for hearing before the High Court Evidence was called and there was a full hearing of the claim The proceedings were at hearing for ten days On the 13th of July 2004 Ms Justice Laffoy delivered a 59 page judgment which dismissed the plaintiff s claims While the hearing before this Court on 9 December 2015 with which this judgement is concerned with only involves matters in the 1987 proceedings a number of the matters in the 1995 proceedings are relevant to these present proceedings In the first place the Statement of Claim in Rooney No 2 is helpfully recorded in the judgment of Laffoy J It shows that the claim as formulated was closely connected to the 1987 proceedings He sought to include the Statement of Claim in Rooney No 1 in the 1995 proceedings along with a further set of proceedings the 1993 proceedings The Statement of Claim provided as follows 1 The Plaintiff is a Farmer The first second and third Defendants are actively involved in the government through the workings of the government or in the offering of legal advice to the government 2 The statement of claim delivered on the 6th day of November 1989 by John Rooney in Rooney v The Minister for Agriculture and Food 1987 No 1120 Sp Ct 6 is included in this statement of claim copy duly signed annexed to same 3 Statement of claim delivered on the 2nd day of March 1993 by John Rooney in Rooney v The Minister for Agriculture and Food 1993 No 706P is included in this statement of claim copy duly signed annexed to same 4 That the Bovine TB Eradication Scheme is being operated contrary to Bunreacht na hÉireann contrary to the law of the European Union and Directives 64 432 EEC as amended 77 391 EEC contrary to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and mal fides is specifically alleged 5 That the Bovine TB Eradication Scheme as operated under the Bovine Tuberculosis Attestation of the State and General Provisions Order 1989 is being operated contrary to the objectives of the Diseases of Animals Act 1966 a consolidating Act and further that the Bovine Tuberculosis Attestation of the State and General Provisions Order 1989 is ultra vires the Disease of Animals Act 1966 and that mala fides is specifically alleged 6 The Plaintiff s cattle herd has been unlawfully restricted from the 7th day of April 1993 and mala fides is specifically alleged 7 That the Defendants their servants or agents have maliciously interfered with and damaged the Plaintiff s farming business causing loss and damage and further that the Plaintiff has been deprived of the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions contrary to Article 1 of Protocol No 1 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 8 That the Defendants their servants or agents have breached the Plaintiff s constitutional right to privacy in their manner of dealing with and passing of private and confidential sensitive constitutional communications dated 8th March 1994 9 That the Defendants their servants or agents have damaged the Plaintiff s reputation causing loss and damage 10 That the Defendants their servants or agents have trespassed upon the Plaintiff s property and chattels causing loss and damage AND THE PLAINTIFF CLAIMS 1 For loss and damages suffered at the hands of the Defendants their servants or agents 2 Damages for Defendants their servants or agents breaching of the Rule of Law 3 Costs being time and monies expended in preparing for litigation 25 A number of points may be made about this Statement of Claim First the 1987 proceedings referred to are Rooney No 1 and the proceedings with which this Court is concerned on these applications The judgment of Laffoy J records that Mr Rooney informed the Court that the 1993 proceedings referred to in paragraph 3 were no longer in existence It is also important that the plaintiff s claim however formulated was one for damages Finally it was specifically pleaded and claimed in general terms that the scheme was contrary to the Constitution and contrary to the law of the European Union and specifically Directive 64 432 EEC and 77 391 EEC No particulars were sought of these pleas and accordingly the argument was not restricted in any narrow way Indeed as Finnegan J later observed in his judgment on the appeal delivered on the 18th of November 2010 the argument ranged over issues which had been determined in Rooney No 1 As he stated In what can only be regarded as a significant concession to the appellant the learned trail judge dealt with matters which were clearly res judicata 26 Laffoy J herself observed at page 41 of her judgment that the defendants had met the case by endeavouring to deal with all the submissions made by the plaintiff In particular the defendants did not seek to rely on the well established jurisprudence that the doctrine of res judicata extends to matters which might have been brought forward by a party to litigation as part of the subject in contest but which were not brought forward because of negligence inadvertence or even accident Henderson v Henderson 1843 3 Hare 100 which was recently followed by the Supreme Court in Carroll v Ryan 2003 1 IR 309 Again this approach taken by the defendants and the trial judge in Rooney No 2 can only be seen as being exceptionally fair to Mr Rooney 27 I have set out the terms of the Statement of Claim because in the course of this appeal Mr Rooney handed in what he described as an amended Statement of Claim which he said he had sought to deliver in Rooney No 2 in the course of the proceedings but was refused permission The entirety of that Statement of Claim was underlined indicating that it was new It contained 18 detailed paragraphs and subparagraphs and subheadings and showed perhaps the effect of Mr Rooney s legal studies For present purposes it will be sufficient to identify the claims made by the plaintiff which were as follows And the plaintiff claims i A Declaration that Council Directive 77 391 EEC and 78 52 EEC have not been validly transposed into the law of the Republic of Ireland ii A Declaration that the non statutory system of reactor grants operating as part of the TB scheme and brucellosis scheme is repugnant to the provisions of Article 15 2 1 of Bunreacht na hÉireann iii A Declaration that the 1989 TB order is ultra vires first named Defendant s powers under the 1966 Act iv If necessary such order by way of injunction or mandamus directing first named Defendant to put in place a statutory system of compensation for animals slaughtered under the instructions of official veterinarians acting as servants or agents of the 1st named Defendant in the operation of the TB scheme and the Brucellosis Scheme v A Declaration that the bovine tuberculosis testing procedures applied by 1st named Defendant s servants or agents in respect of the bovine tuberculosis testing of the Plaintiff s cattle herd did not comply with the provisions of Council Directive 64 432 EEC as amended vi A Declaration that 1st named Defendant is precluded by the provisions of s 6 of the Diseases of Animals Act 1966 from imposing a charge or causing a charge to be levied on herd owners in respect of the costs of testing animals under the TB and Brucellosis Schemes vii Damages for breach of constitutional rights viii Damages for trespass ix Such further Orders or Declaratory or other relief in keeping the Defendants obligation under European Union law and under Bunreacht na hÉireann as this Honourable Court deems and just x Further or other reliefs xi Costs For present purposes it is necessary to note the claim at paragraph ii that the statutory scheme was contrary to Article 15 2 1 of the Constitution 28 In a lengthy and careful judgment delivered on the 13th of July 2004 Ms Justice Laffoy dismissed all the claims Laffoy J dismissed the claim that the scheme was contrary to the Constitution relying in part on the decision of Murphy J in Grennan v The Minister for Agriculture Had the plaintiff complied with the requirements of the 1989 Order the contentious animal would have been one of the animals slaughtered under the scheme in 1993 in the belief or on the suspicion of being affected with bovine tuberculosis Given the prevalence of the disease and the potential volume of reactors I agree with the conclusion of Murphy J in the Grennan case that the scheme in place between 1993 and 1996 was an entirely reasonable method of reconciling the interest of a herd owner such as the plaintiff whose diseased or suspected diseased animal was directed to be slaughtered and the requirements of the common good in preventing the further spread of disease and that the scheme accorded with the Constitution In relation to the challenge that the scheme was contrary to European law Laffoy J was prepared to assume a failure to implement the directive into Irish law but since this was a claim for damages held that the plaintiff had suffered no loss What happened was that the plaintiff s herd was lawfully restricted under Irish law Shortly thereafter when the contentious animal was declared to be a reactor despite being persistently urged to do so the plaintiff refused to have the animal slaughtered and to initiate the process which would have led to de restriction The plaintiff claims damages for the losses he alleges flowed from the restriction of his herd between 1993 and 1996 That situation was brought about by the plaintiff s own conduct Later she held The losses which the plaintiff alleges he incurred between 1993 and 1996 could have been wholly avoided if the plaintiff had complied with the provisions of the 1989 Order in relation to herd restriction herd testing and the slaughter of reactors to which he professes having no objection Accordingly the plaintiff had not established that there was a causal link between the losses in respect of which he claimed damages and the State s obligation to implement Article 3 2 of Directive 78 52 EEC Even taking the narrow view and that the plaintiff was confined solely to the loss in relation to the contentious animal the plaintiff had simply not established by evidence that there would have been any difference between the measure of compensation under such a scheme and that which was available to him under the non statutory scheme The Appeal to the Supreme Court in Rooney No 2 29 On appeal to the Supreme Court in 2009 it is clear that once again the argument was not limited to narrow issues In particular the first substantive ground addressed by Finnegan J at page 12 of his judgment was phrased in this way The learned trial judge failed to deal with Article 15 of the Constitution and the decision of the Supreme Court in O Neill v Minister for Agriculture and Food 1997 2 I L R M 435 It seems clear therefore that the Article 15 issue had certainly been ventilated in the appeal It is only fair to record that Mr Rooney took issue with this sentence in the judgement because he considered that it did not properly recite the grounds he relied on He said that he had relied on three Articles of the Constitution Article 15 2 1 Article 40 3 and Article 43 before Laffoy J but the judgement did not record the fact that he had relied on Article 15 2 1 He suggested however that Mr Justice Finnegan s judgement in the portion set out above recited grounds which were not the grounds he had argued He said Mr Justice Finnegan completely twisted what I said I never said it It is mentioned in the Supreme Court judgement of 18th of November 2001 that Mr Rooney argues and I ll say that slowly because important to take a note that Mr Rooney argues that he relies on Article 15 2 1 as authority of the State cannot implement European Union law using administrative rules and circulars In my submissions to the Court and in my written and oral submissions the argument I put before those three judges were that Ireland could not implement EU law using administrative rules and circulars I used Brown v the Attorney General as the authority and I used Commission v Belgium and both Ms Justice Laffoy and Ms Justice Macken and Mr Justice Hardiman and Mr Justice Finnegan on the transcript the DAR will bear this out I solely relied on Article 15 2 1 and O Neill v Minister for Agriculture is absolute authority that the Irish Government the Executive could not change the law could not bring in a non statutory scheme because it was repugnant to Article 15 2 1 of the Constitution Now I am very I don t like to say it but it was a crime upon Bunreacht na hÉireann to put that in a judgement and the DAR will bear it out The DAR is a digital audio recording system which is operative in the courts It is not necessary to address the detail of Mr Rooney s criticism here of the manner in which the matter is addressed in the judgement of Mr Justice Finnegan Mr Rooney s statement does seem to make it clear that he did rely on Article 15 2 1 of the Constitution and O Neill v The Minister for Agriculture 1997 2 I L R M 435 and accordingly the argument that a non statutory scheme was a breach of that Article was advanced before the Supreme Court The Motion to Amend the Statement of Claim in the 1987 proceedings 30 It appears in the aftermath of the decision in Rooney No 2 that Mr Rooney made an application in 2006 to reactivate the application to amend the Statement of Claim in Rooney No 1 Clarke J re entered the motion It appears there was a further lengthy hearing before Smith J on the question of whether that application was now captured by the terms of the decision of the Supreme Court on the 5th of October 2001 restraining further action without leave of the Supreme Court Smith J held that the application was covered by the Order and that accordingly the application could not proceed since leave had not been obtained That matter was appealed to the Supreme Court in circumstances where the court also addressed the question of whether the Motion for Judgment had been disposed of or still remained to be determined under Appeal No 111 1990 In relation to Appeal No 217 2007 Finnegan J held in the same judgment delivered on the 9th March 2010 that the Isaac Wunder order should be interpreted narrowly and as relating to the special case only Accordingly the High Court should proceed to hear and determine the claim to amend the Statement of Claim Finnegan J came to this conclusion because he considered that the order had been made while this decision in the special case is pending In fact as I think Mr Rooney recognised this was probably an error since the vexatious litigant order was made 10 years after the special case had been determined but if so it favoured him The thrust of the judgement was clearly directed towards permitting Mr Rooney to bring the application Again this was an order in favour of Mr Rooney and which was if anything generous to him 31 Pursuant to this decision of the Supreme Court of the 9th of March 2010 the matter came back before Mr Justice Murphy in the High Court on the 18th of November 2010 This should be recalled was an application to amend the Statement of Claim in Rooney No 1 in relation to proceedings issued in 1987 and a final version of a Statement of Claim delivered in 1989 and adjudicated upon by both the High Court and Supreme Court as of December 1991 On the argument to this appeal Mr Rooney said that it was practically similar to the amended Statement of Claim which he had not been permitted deploy in Rooney No 2 There are substantial similarities but the amended Statement of Claim here contains additional parties and some different claims In particular and surprisingly it purports to seek to make claims against both the IFA defendants and the Ombudsman who had of course been struck out of the proceedings in 1991 and were not involved in the 1995 proceedings at all The Statement of Claim contains 20 paragraphs and the claims are as follow i A Declaration that Council Directive 77 391 EEC and 78 52 EEC have not been validly transposed into the law of the Republic of Ireland ii A Declaration that Council Directive 64 432 EEC as amended has not been validly transposed in to the law of the Republic of Ireland iii A Declaration that the non statutory system of reactor grants operating as part of the TB scheme and Brucellosis Scheme is repugnant to the provisions of Article 15 2 1 of Bunreacht na hÉireann iv A Declaration that the 1978 TB order is ultra vires first named Defendants powers under the 1966 Act v If necessary such order by way of injunction or mandamus directing 1st named Defendant to put in place a statutory system of compensation for animals slaughtered under the instructions of official veterinarians acting as servants or agents of the first named defendant in the operation of the TB Scheme and the Brucellosis Scheme vi A Declaration that the bovine tuberculosis testing procedures applied by first named Defendant s servants or agents in respect of the bovine tuberculosis testing of Plaintiff s cattle herd did not comply with the provisions of Council Directive 64 432 EEC as amended vii A Declaration that 1st named Defendant is precluded by the provisions of s 6 of the Diseases of Animals Act 1966 from imposing a charge or causing a charge to be levied on herd owners in respect of the costs of testing animals under the TB and Brucellosis Schemes viii A Declaration that the 6th named Defendant by its predecessor the National Farmers Association negotiated with the 1st 2nd and or 3rd named Defendants the bringing into force of non statutory TB reactors grants in respect of cattle slaughtered under the TB scheme at the direction of the 1st named Defendant ix A Declaration that the 1st named Defendant his servants or agents wrongfully and directly interfered with the Plaintiff s cattle herd x A Declaration that the Ombudsman last named defendant failed to investigate fairly or adequately the substance of Plaintiff s said allegations xi A Declaration that the first named Defendant his servant or agent from after the 19th day of December 1990 knowingly operated an unlawful and unstatutory reactor grant movement permit based direction to slaughter scheme in the face of the High Court decision handed down by Mr Justice Lardner in Lucey Madigan and The Minister for Agriculture and Food 1989 No 64 Judicial Review xii Damages for breaches of constitutional rights xiii Damages for trespass xiv Such further Orders or Declaratory or other relief in keeping with the Defendants obligations under European Union law and under Bunreacht na hÉireann deems meet and just xv Further or other relief xvi Costs It is apparent that the there are broad similarities between the proposed amendment and what was sought to be introduced in the 1995 proceedings For present purposes the significance is however the fact that both documents include a specific plea that the non statutory scheme was contrary to Article 15 of the Constitution and European law as it was contended that the non statutory scheme should have been provided for and administered on a statutory basis As we have seen it does appear that this matter was argued to some extent in Rooney No 2 A Third Set of Proceedings 2013 32 Before turning to the two issues which were the subject of the hearing on the 9th of December 2015 it is necessary to address one further set of proceedings Almost three years ago on the 19th of December 2012 Mr Rooney commenced a further set of proceedings raising complaints about the manner in which the Supreme Court had dealt with his previous appeals seeking an injunction restraining the execution of costs orders that had been made against him A Statement of Claim was delivered on the 14th of March 2013 Paragraph 4 referred to 1985 dispute the 1985 proceedings and paragraph 5 to the 1993 dispute the 1995 proceedings In respect of each set of proceedings he maintained that the real question and controversy had not been dealt with The reference to real question and controversy is a reference to the test normally applied in an application to amend pleadings He sought declarations among other things that the proceedings had not reflected the true issues between the parties and consequently that those issues had not merged in the judgments in both cases In replies to particulars he confirmed that he was not seeking to impugn the judgments delivered in the 1987 and 1995 proceedings However he also brought a motion in the same proceedings seeking to set aside both judgments contending among other things that it was beyond argument that reactor grants are repugnant to the provisions of Article 15 2 1 of the Constitution The proceedings also made complaints about the conduct of some of the members of the judiciary who have heard Mr Rooney s cases 33 The proceedings were case managed by the late Mr Justice Feeney As might have been predicted an application was brought by the defendants to strike out the proceedings on the grounds that they failed to disclose a cause of action and were frivolous and vexatious and bound to fail On the 4th of July 2013 Feeney J delivered a further lengthy judgment Unreported High Court At page 23 of the transcript of the judgment he observed correctly in my view It is manifest from the judgments of all courts and in particular from the judgments in Rooney No 2 that Mr Rooney was given every opportunity to make the case he sought to make based upon his claim as made by him and formulated by him in his pleadings Mr Rooney pleaded his own case The claims in those proceedings were considered after he had been given a full opportunity to expound such claims Now after he has lost he seeks to reformulate his claim based upon a different basis which he did not plead He cannot do that as the case is complete and the reason was no duty on either the lawyer of the other side or on the court or the judges to direct or advise or identify any matter to be pleaded or claimed by Mr Rooney It was a matter for Mr Rooney to ensure that any question and controversy was identified by him and pleaded by him and it was not for any other person The claimed breach of duty is a claim based upon an obligation to identify the real issues There is no such duty The duty on the court is to decide the case as pleaded by a plaintiff lay or otherwise The duty on the lawyers for the defence is to defend the case as pleaded and not to identify other or extra or real issues that might have been pleaded by the Plaintiff Feeney J referred with approval to a judgment of Mr Justice

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  • would appear that any claim to enforce same is statute barred 16th December 2015 this case comes for hearing before this Court with both sides represented by solicitor and counsel No dispute 6 ACC Bank does not contest that in the event that the appellant Kathleen Lynn is entitled to as is sought raise the same point as in Irwin v Deasy 2011 2 IR 752 that the High Court lacked jurisdiction and that the order of McKechnie J cannot stand It must be remembered that a judgment mortgage is purely an order in execution It is subject to particular safeguards that are set down in law over centuries 7 What is in dispute is that ACC Bank opposes the raising of what is described as a new point by Kathleen Lynn The effect of not allowing this point to be argued was responsibly accepted by ACC Bank as meaning that an order of the High Court would be upheld by this Court where the original order was made without jurisdiction In that regard for the avoidance of doubt it should be remembered that the decision of Finlay Geoghegan J in Irwin v Deasy No 1 was correctly opened to the High Court and that as of the date of the judgment of McKechnie J he was required to follow that judgment save in the exceptional circumstances where a judge does not follow a decision of the court at the same level The appellant bank further argues that in the event that the new point is allowed to be argued on appeal that it should be subject to condition whereby the matter is remitted to the High Court with an entitlement to ACC Bank to amend the pleadings to enable a claim for an order for sale of the lands and a distribution of the proceeds of sale be made under Part 2 and specifically section 117 of the Land and Conveyancing Law Reform Act 2009 Any such condition is opposed by counsel on behalf of Kathleen Lynn New point on appeal 8 Movie News Ltd v Galway County Council Supreme Court unreported 25th July 1977 sets out clearly the reasons why points not argued before the High Court should not save in the most exceptional circumstances be argued for the first time on appeal to the Supreme Court As Henchy J stated it would be wrong for the Supreme Court under the guise of an appeal to enter on the trial of a matter as of first instance and thereby deprive the party aggrieved with its decision of the constitutional right of appeal which he would have if that matter had been decided in the High Court Nonetheless this Court retains discretion to enable a point not argued at trial to be considered on appeal In Lough Swilly Shellfish Growers v Bradley 2013 IR 227 O Donnell J at paragraph 26 stated However with respect to the judgment of Henchy J in Movie News Ltd v Galway County Council the proposition that the objection to any argument of a new point in an appeal is grounded in the constitutional right of appeal is not beyond argument Indeed if it were so it is hard to see how it could admit of the exceptions unless the exceptions were themselves mandated by the Constitution Most importantly from the perspective of this case he emphasised in the same paragraph that the Constitution does not expressly limit appeals to points argued at trial What the Constitution requires is an appeal which permits the Supreme Court to consider whether the result in the High Court is correct The precise format and procedure of any such appeal is not dictated by the Constitution While that object is often and best achieved by a careful analysis of the argument in the High Court and the High Court s adjudication of said argument it does not follow that the constitutional appeal must always be limited to that process 9 The argument of points on appeal not considered at first instance encompasses circumstances that point to potentially extreme contrasts between the factors which enable the exercise by this Court of what is a broad discretion There is a continuum between lack of merit in bringing in fresh points on appeal simply because they have occurred to the parties or their lawyers late in the day and cases where the discretion should favour an appellant In exercising that discretion the fundamental point is where the balance of fairness lies That however cannot be the only factor Given that the Constitution as Henchy J stated in Movie News Ltd v Galway County Council case contemplates a full hearing of all issues at first instance and an appeal only on such points of law as have been fully ventilated at first instance a party seeking to raise a novel legal issue on appeal must justify that by reference to some special or extraordinary factor In a broad sense it can be possible to describe the circumstances in which that argument might find purchase As O Donnell J said in that judgment at paragraph 28 There is a spectrum of cases in which a new issue is sought to be argued on appeal At one extreme lie cases such as those where argument of the point would necessarily involve new evidence and with a consequent effect on the evidence already given as in K D Otherwise C v M C 1985 I R 697 for example or where a party seeks to make an argument which was actually abandoned in the High Court as in Movie News Ltd v Galway County Council Unreported Supreme Court 25th July 1977 or for example where a party sought to make an argument which was diametrically opposed to that which had been advanced in the High Court and on the basis of which the High Court case had been argued and perhaps evidence adduced In such cases leave would not be granted to argue a new

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